The Korean War, wrote Paul Cummings for the History News Network in 2005, is “assumed to have been a limited war, but its prosecution bore a strong resemblance to the air war against Imperial Japan in the second world war, and was often directed by the same US military leaders.” For instance

The air force dropped 625 tons of bombs over North Korea on 12 August, a tonnage that would have required a fleet of 250 B-17s in the second world war. By late August B-29 formations were dropping 800 tons a day on the North. Much of it was pure napalm. From June to late October 1950, B-29s unloaded 866,914 gallons of napalm.

Early in the war, General Douglas MacArthur, leader of the United Nations command, anticipated Chinese intervention.

“I see here a unique use for the atomic bomb — to strike a blocking blow — which would require a six months’ repair job. Sweeten up my B-29 force.”

Nuclear weapons: not just a force multiplier, but a force sweetener. In any event, at the time, MacArthur’s suggestion was shelved. But when Chinese troops later entered North Korea, President Truman threatened the use of nuclear weapons. Then

… MacArthur said he had a plan that would have won the war in 10 days: “I would have dropped 30 or so atomic bombs . . . strung across the neck of Manchuria.” Then he would have … “spread behind us — from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea — a belt of radioactive cobalt . . . it has an active life of between 60 and 120 years. For at least 60 years there could have been no land invasion of Korea from the North.” He was certain that the Russians would have done nothing about this extreme strategy: “My plan was a cinch.”

MacArthur, wrote Cumings, “sounds like a warmongering lunatic”

… but he was not alone. Before the Sino-Korean offensive, a committee of the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] had said that atomic bombs might be the decisive factor in cutting off a Chinese advance into Korea; initially they could be useful in “a cordon sanitaire.” … A few months later Congressman Albert Gore, Sr. … suggested “something cataclysmic” to end the war: a radiation belt dividing the Korean peninsula permanently into two.”

If readers are able to unearth another example of plans to use nuclear bombs to irradiate a strip of land to act as a defense or buffer, kindly inform us. For now, it stands as the silliest use devised for nuclear weapons. Except of course for nuclear deterrence: the idea that possession of nuclear weapons can prevent nuclear war even for the foreseeable future.

The post The Award for Most Inventive Use of a Nuclear Weapon Goes To… appeared first on The Faster Times.

Russia does not exclude preemptive use of weapons against [NATO] missile defense systems in Europe but only as a last resort, the Russian General Staff said on Thursday at a missile defense conference in Moscow.

“The placement of new strike weapons in the south and northwest of Russia against [NATO] missile defense components … is one possible way of incapacitating the European missile defense infrastructure,” Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said.

Taking into account the “destabilizing nature of the missile defense system… the decision on the pre-emptive use of available weapons will be made during an aggravation of the situation,” he said.

Exactly why missile defense is destabilizing can be difficult to grasp (at least it was for me). After all, it only seems natural for a state to seek to protect itself against nuclear attack. Besides, how can a parry be considered as aggressive as a thrust? I once endeavored to explain in a post.

Here’s how it works. A state — Russia again — is considered vulnerable to a first, or initial, strike by the United States, during the course of which many of its surface (as opposed to those based in submarines, which are, of course, mobile) nuclear weapons would be wiped out. (This argument requires a suspension of belief that Russia would refrain from launching a counterattack on warning, that is, while the U.S. missiles were in the air, instead of waiting until they struck — still the only sure-fire method of verifying a nuclear attack.)

Russia’s retaliatory force would be further diminished if much of it was destroyed while in the air by U.S. missile defense. (This requires a suspension of belief that the day when missile defense is that effective will ever come). The crux of this theory is that since Russia knows that under this arrangement it’s going to lose missiles both on the ground and in the air it’s motivated to build more to compensate. (Why Russian missile defense isn’t considered destabilizing to America’s “deterrent” is a question seldom, if ever, raised.)

More from the RIA Novosti article:

“By 2018-2020 – that is the third and fourth phases of the deployment of the Euro-missile defense in Europe – the continent should have enough [NATO] anti-missile defense to be able to intercept part of Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine launched ballistic missiles,” Patrushev said at an international conference on Euro-missile defense in Moscow.

At the Christian Science Monitor, Yousaff Butt backed this up.

The problem with European missile defense is that while it’s designed to counter Iran, the faster interceptors due to come online in 2018 will also be able to engage Russian warheads, upsetting this all-important perception of parity.

Though what Butt probably meant by “designed to counter Iran” was in the highly unlikely event that Iran develops missiles that could reach Europe, not to mention the nuclear weapons that would be affixed to them as warheads. Meanwhile RIA Novosti reported that NATO’s Deputy General Secretary Alexander Vershbow said:

“In fact, we have no desire at all to disturb global strategic stability,” he told the conference. “Quite the contrary: NATO missile defense will be capable of intercepting only a small number of relatively unsophisticated ballistic missiles. It does not have the capability to neutralize Russian deterrence.”

Ivan Oelrich explained in the January/February issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (behind a pay wall)

Almost all independent US analysts—that is, those outside the government and the defense industry—are deeply skeptical of the feasibility of missile defenses, especially against a technically sophisticated country like Russia. To these skeptics, therefore, Russia’s position seems frustratingly irrational: Russia is letting the potential for mutually beneficial arrangements be undermined by the USA’s politically motivated pursuit of a system that will never work.

But Patrushev said:

“Our experts say other targets, which could require serious missile defense against it, do not really exist.”

The United States and NATO may act like Russia is being a drama queen about missile defense, but it knows very well that the system will never be used against Iran. Even if that were its intention, it would be years before it’s necessary to defend Europe against Iran — years of NATO missile-defense deployment acting as a burr in Russia’s saddle as well as an ongoing obstacle to disarmament. Not only is missile defense destabilizing, it’s an endless fund of misinformation between the United States and Russia.

The post Missile Defense: Ever the Fly in the Ointment of U.S.-Russia Relations appeared first on The Faster Times.

In the late eighties and early nineties, AQ Khan, lord of Pakistan’s nuclear-weapons program as well as the nuclear black market, shared know-how and components with Iran. Then, in late 2002, it was learned that Iran had built a uranium enrichment plant at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak. It appears, though, that in 2003 all but vestigial research toward an Iranian nuclear-weapons program ended.

For better or worse, that’s 55 years, off and on, that Iran’s name has been linked with the word nuclear and 25 years since Iran initiated actual work on developing nuclear weapons. By contrast, the United States developed nuclear weapons from scratch in four years during what, compared to today, was the technological dark ages. In the interim, many other states have also succeeded in relatively short timeframes. Thus, it doesn’t strike most in the West as plausible that a developed state like Iran has yet to bring its program — if you’re among those who believe that, in fact, it exists — to fruition.

Jacques E. C. Hymans of the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California addresses Iran’s inability (again, if you accept that it’s trying) to close the nuclear circle in an article in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs titled “Botching the Bomb: Why Nuclear Weapons Programs Often Fail on Their Own — and Why Iran’s Might, Too” (behind a pay wall). He begins by providing an example of an official skeptical of how long it’s taking Iran to close the circle (again, assuming you’re among those who believe that’s what it seeks). [Emphasis added.]

“Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years,” a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion. … Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb.

In Iran’s case — and I’ll issue this disclaimer just once more: assuming you believe that they’re trying to develop nuclear weapons — a number of factors have contributed to the delay. Foremost among them is that because Iran signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty it’s subject to monitoring and verification. Other reasons include imported nuclear components that the West has sabotaged and killing of scientists, the reduction of the nuclear black market to but a shadow of itself, and sanctions. But here, according to Hymans, is the essential reason in Iran as well as other states:

The great proliferation slowdown. … is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians.

In fact, according to Hymans,

… most rulers of recent would-be nuclear states have tended to rely on a coercive, authoritarian management approach to advance their quest for the bomb, using appeals to scientists’ greed and fear as the primary motivators. That coercive approach is a major mistake, because it produces a sense of alienation in the workers by removing their sense of professionalism. As a result, nuclear programs lose their way. Moreover, underneath these bad management choices lie bad management cultures. In developing states with inadequate civil service protections, every decision tends to become politicized, and state bureaucrats quickly learn to keep their heads down. Not even the highly technical matters faced by nuclear scientific and technical workers are safe from meddling politicians. The result is precisely the reverse of what the politicians intend: not heightened efficiency but rather a mixture of bureaucratic sloth, corruption, and endless blame shifting.

He uses Iraq as an example. On the other hand, Hymans writes:

… military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program’s worst enemies — Iran’s political leaders — to hinder the country’s nuclear progress all by themselves. … The world is lucky that during the past few decades, the leaders of would-be nuclear weapons states have been so good at frustrating and alienating their scientists. The United States and its partners must take care not to adopt policies that resolve those leaders’ management problems for them.

Unfortunately policymakers vulnerable to the conventional wisdom that Iran is developing nuclear weapons may well be too susceptible to pressure from hawks to exhibit that degree of patience and restraint.

The post When Nuclear Weapons Programs Fail to Ripen appeared first on The Faster Times.

Here are further excerpts from his pronouncements, about which I recently posted (Iran Tries to Take the Moral High Ground on Nukes). More from the February speech (the translation on his official website):

Nuclear weapons are not at all beneficial to us. Moreover, from an ideological and fiqhi perspective, we consider developing nuclear weapons as unlawful. We consider using such weapons as a big sin. We also believe that keeping such weapons is futile and dangerous, and we will never go after them.

In 2011 Ayatollah Khameini spoke about nuclear weapons at greater length.

Iran is not after an atomic bomb, and it is even opposed to possession of chemical weapons. Even when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran, we did not try to manufacture chemical weapons. Such things are not in line with the principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Furthermore, he declared that nuclear weapons “are useless except for intimidation, massacre and a false sense of security based on pre-emptive power resulting from guaranteed annihilation of everyone.” Citing the atom bombs that the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Risen quoted him saying (emphasis added):

The use of nuclear weapons resulted not only in large-scale killings and destruction, but also in indiscriminate massacre of people. … Therefore, using or even threatening to use such weapons is considered a serious violation of the most basic humanitarian rules and is a clear manifestation of war crimes.

Risen points out, though, that:

… those comments are not only at odds with some of Iran’s behavior but also with. … remarks Ayatollah Khamenei made last year that it was a mistake for Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi of Libya to give up his nuclear weapons program.

Referring to Colonel Qaddafi, Ayatollah Khamenei said that “this gentleman wrapped up all his nuclear facilities, packed them on a ship and delivered them to the West and said, ‘Take them!’ “

“Look where we are, and in what position they are now,” he added.

Risen, however, fails to note that those remarks sound less like Ayatollah Khamanei expressing his personal feelings than stating a fact. Risen then writes:

Complicating matters further, some analysts say that Ayatollah Khamenei’s denial of Iranian nuclear ambitions has to be seen as part of a Shiite historical concept called taqiyya, or religious dissembling. For centuries an oppressed minority within Islam, Shiites learned to conceal their sectarian identity to survive, and so there is a precedent for lying to protect the Shiite community.

In response to Risen, Juan Cole examines taqiyya more closely.

Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, who led the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, demanded that taqiyya be abandoned in favor of holy war or jihad. Shiite expert Rainer Brunner argues that pious dissimulation has “completely lost its importance” in contemporary, Shiite-majority Iran.

So the idea that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the theocratic leader of a Shiite-majority Islamic Republic, would give a dishonest fatwa about a key principle in Islamic law (the prohibition on killing innocent non-combatants in war) is a non-starter. Khamenei, being in Khomeini’s tradition, is bound by the latter’s hostility to dissimulation.

That may well be, but considering his brutal record, Ayatollah Khameini’s ethical code can only be judged as selective at best. In 2009 accounts by a defector from his private guard provided insights into his ruthless policies, as well as his lavish lifestyle. For instance, the defector — considered credible by many — provided:

… new information that links Ayatollah Khamenei to the brutal assault on protestors following the presidential elections in June. The man [named Hossain Taeb] alleged to have [been] carrying out interrogations of prisoners at the notorious Kahrizak detention centre, where at least three people were tortured to death, is a key part of the inner circle. [He] is said to have run an extensive surveillance operation for the personal use of Ayatollah Khamenei for almost 15 years. Each evening the leader is said to listen to recordings of senior officials and colleague talking about him in a compilation that normally lasts 20 minutes. [Meanwhile] the leader’s second son… played a prominent role in organising the Basij militia that has meted out violence against protesters. [Like the Stalinesque touch where the emphasis is added? -- RW]

But Gareth Porter provides more evidence that Ayatollah Khameini sought to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

When the IAEA passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend enrichment and adopt an intrusive monitoring system in September [2003]. … hardliners were arguing publicly that Iran should withdraw from the NPT rather than make any effort to convince the West that Iran did not intend to make nuclear weapons.

Sometime in September and October, Khamenei ordered the designation of the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rohani, who reported directly to him, as the single individual responsible for coordinating all aspects of nuclear policy. … It was Rohani himself who announced on Oct. 25, 2003, that Khamenei believed that nuclear weapons were illegal under Islam.

Still, it behooves us to revisit some of Ayatollah Khomeini’s comments for a moment.

… we do not possess a nuclear weapon, and we will not build one. … Iran is not seeking to have the atomic bomb. … using or even threatening to use such weapons is considered a serious violation of the most basic humanitarian rules and is a clear manifestation of war crimes.

Ayatollah Khomeini addresses the possession and use of nuclear weapons, but neglects to mention developing or acquiring the capability to build nuclear weapons without actually manufacturing and deploying them. One might be inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that denouncing what’s known as “latent” or “virtual” deterrence is obviously implied in condemning the use of weapons.

First of all, though, even though he was never a marja (a grand ayatollah empowered to make decisions in religious law), it’s a mistake to overlook the fondness for hair-splitting that theological authorities of all stripes share with lawyers (the “How many angels can fit on the head of a pin?” syndrome). In other words, Ayatollah Khameini may see actual nuclear weapons and their deployment as a sin, but not the capability to manufacture them.

Let’s return now to Risen’s statement that he “often uses religious language when he talks about the nuclear issue, which can jar Western analysts trying to gauge the meaning of such strong statements.” The “jarring” or disconnect may occur because of a natural tendency on our part to hold a religious leader — who just happens to be the leader of a state — to a higher standard. The truth is, Ayatollah Khameini probably hedges and equivocates like any ruler. His disinclination to live up to the ethical and spiritual standards to which a religious leader ought to aspire shouldn’t serve as an excuse to avoid treating him and his people like statesmen and negotiating with them in good faith.

The post Are Nuclear Weapons Really a “Big Sin” to Iran’s Supreme Leader? appeared first on The Faster Times.

For example ISIS declared that the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on Iran contained “the most comprehensive detail and analysis to date [of] evidence of nuclear weaponization-related activities conducted by Iran.” Nevertheless, it concluded, “Notably absent … is any assessment by the IAEA of Iran’s capability to make a nuclear explosive device based on what it learned through these activities.”

Meanwhile, at Race for Iran, Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett write that in no way does the IAEA report “demonstrate that Iran is ‘developing a nuclear weapon.” Besides, according to Article II of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran is a party, “non-nuclear-weapon state signatories [are not permitted] ‘to manufacture or otherwise acquire’” nuclear weapons. In other words, write the Leveretts:

“The Treaty prohibits the building of actual weapons. It does not prohibit signatories from studying nuclear weapons designs … or even conducting experiments on high-explosives of the sort that could be used in a bomb.”

However, in a paper for the “Nuclear Iran” section of ISIS’s website in November of last year titled Iran Nuclear Issue – Considerations for a Negotiated Outcomet, John Carlson begs to differ. The former Director General of the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office writes: “To ‘manufacture’ cannot be interpreted so narrowly that there is no violation of Article II until a nuclear weapon is fully assembled – this would be an unreasonably rigorous approach that would undermine the practical value of the NPT.” He continues:

“Since the purpose of nuclear hedging [the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons as opposed to their actual possession] is to be in a position to make nuclear weapons, at the very least nuclear hedging is not a “peaceful purpose”, hence is not a purpose permitted by Article IV [the general right to use nuclear energy]. … But it is not clear how far preparations to make nuclear weapons can progress before a state will be regarded as being in violation of Article II.”

How is whether or not “the real purpose of an ostensibly peaceful program is to establish a nuclear weapon capability” determined? Carlson answers.

“The fact that [determining] this might not be straightforward is no justification for accepting hedging as a legitimate activity. A number of indicators can be identified that would help distinguish a peaceful program from one whose purpose is hedging. [Such as] determining whether pursuit of the fuel cycle in question — uranium enrichment or reprocessing — is consistent with the state’s nuclear energy needs.”

Carlson concludes:

“Any outcome to the Iranian situation that proceeds on the basis that hedging is acceptable will be fundamentally flawed — it would mislead Iran about international tolerance levels, and mislead the international community about Iran’s commitment to non-proliferation. No outcome will provide the necessary international confidence if states continue to think the real purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is to establish a break-out capability.”

This disarmament advocate is inclined to agree as long as this argument isn’t used to threaten Iran further. Furthermore, write the ISIS staff (David Albright, Paul Brannan, Andrea Stricker and Andrew Ortendahl) in a January 2012 report titled Reality Check: Shorter and Shorter Timeframe if Iran Decides to Make Nuclear Weapons:

Given Iran’s steady, albeit slow progress, downplaying the threat can end up serving to undermine the development of non-military methods to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons.

“In other words, they support continued sanctions. But, from this disarmament activist’s point of view, what ‘can end up serving to undermine the development of non-military methods to keep Iran from building nuclear weapons’ to an even greater extent is failure by Western nuclear powers to show unconditional disarmament leadership — whether it’s likely to succeed or not. Though states that seek to proliferate may either ignore such substantive steps or even gloat over them, there’s no other recourse for the West if, in the long term, it seeks to stay the hand of proliferators.”

Though it’s the correct course of action, calling for disarmament to prevent proliferation is as counterintuitive as asking states to attempt to solve financial crises by spending instead of cutting in the cause of austerity. A tough sell, in other words.

The post Is Disarmament to Proliferation as Spending Is to Austerity? appeared first on The Faster Times.

If you’ll recall, earlier this year, the New START treaty was held hostage by Senate Republicans under the direction of Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ). By way of ransoming it, the Obama administration forked over a proposal to spend $88 billion during the next decade on nuclear-weapon modernization. (As if to show the futility of that approach, while it was ultimately passed, Kyl still didn’t vote in favor of New START.) That figure represents a 20 percent increase above funding levels proposed during the Bush administration.

Equally as sad, as Hans Kristensen wrote at the Federation of American Scientists’ Strategic Security Blog:

“… the treaty does not require destruction of a single nuclear warhead and actually permits the United States and Russia to deploy almost the same number of strategic warheads that were permitted by the 2002 Moscow Treaty [thanks, in part, to a] new counting rule that attributes one weapon to each bomber rather than the actual number of weapons assigned to them. [Even stranger, this] ‘fake’ counting rule frees up a large pool of warhead spaces under the treaty limit that enable each country to deploy many more warheads than would otherwise be the case.

“Indeed, the New START Treaty is not so much a nuclear reductions treaty as it is a verification and confidence building treaty.”

Confidence building is nice and all. But it’s been 62 years since both the United States and the former Soviet Union (and then Russia) have possessed nuclear weapons, 25 years since the pivotal Reykjavík nuclear summit, and 20 years since the end of the Cold War. We’re still just trying to build confidence?

Meanwhile, what does disarmament look like when it’s not just pecking at the inside of its egg struggling to emerge? Regular readers of Focal Points know that we track the progress of the Los Alamos Study Group, a disarmament organization that monitors the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory (the heart of the Manhattan Project during World War II) and is today managed by a Bechtel-led consortium for the National Nuclear Security Administration.

In recent years, the mission of the Los Alamos Study Group (LASG) has been to halt the progress of a Soviet-era-sounding project called the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility (CMRR), intended, in the words of the Los Alamos National Laboratory itself, to perform “analytical chemistry, materials characterization, and metallurgy research and development,” for the production of nuclear pits.

Upon first hearing the phrase, a nuclear pit might sound like a dump for nuclear waste and old warheads. But, as in the pit of a fruit, it’s an origin of life — where the chain reaction occurs in a nuclear warhead. You can be forgiven if you’re surprised that, in light of President Obama’s renowned Prague disarmament speech and New START, however watered down, we’re still creating these obscure objects of destruction. Especially considering that 14,000 pits have been recovered from warheads that have been retired.

Physicist and nuclear policy authority Frank von Hippel recently testified in a lawsuit that the LASG filed against the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

“The need for large-scale pit production has vanished. In 2003, the [NNSA] was arguing that the [United States] needed the capability to produce 125 to 450 pits per year by 2020 to replace the pits in the US weapon stockpile that would be 30 to 40 years old by then. . . . But, in 2006, we learned that US pits were so well made that, according to a Congressionally-mandated review of … pit aging, ‘Most primary types have credible minimum lifetimes in excess of 100 years.’”

Of course, that’s as much bad news — these infernal engines will be around for another century unless they’re dismantled — as good news. Meanwhile, the CMRR project is now expected to cost between $4 and $6 billion. In order to halt or at least stall it, the LASG filed a case against the NNSA seeking a new Environmental Impact Statement (as mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act) to address, among other things, seismic concerns about the project. While that case was dismissed, the LASG is not only appealing it, but filing a second lawsuit toward the same end. In the latest LASG newsletter, Executive Director Greg Mello writes (emphasis added):

“On December 15, House and Senate conferees issued their “megabus” appropriations bill for fiscal year (FY) 2012. [Passed in the Senate and House, though 86 Republicans defied Republican leadership and voted against it. -- RW] … the bill appropriates only 63% of the requested funds for the [CMRR], slashing $100 million (M) from the $270 M proposed spending level in the project. … CMRR and [a project in proximity to it] were the only NNSA Weapons Activities construction projects cut. … The proposed CMRR cut is 90% of the total proposed cut in new NNSA construction. NNSA’s other proposed massive project, the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), slated to be built at the Y-12 Nuclear Security Site in Tennessee, was not cut at all.”

We have no wish to slight the forces arrayed against the Oak Ridge, Tennessee project. But we can’t help but conclude that, along with current economic climate, the Los Alamos Study Group made the difference in slowing progress of the CMRR.

As Mello writes, the funding cut “can be fairly described as one of the few concrete policy accomplishments of the entire arms control and disarmament community in the United States over the past couple of years.” Never mind your garden-party treaties that are guaranteed not to offend — when the construction of a facility designated for the manufacture of nuclear-weapons components is blocked, that’s disarmament you can taste and feel.

The post A Christmas Nuclear Disarmament Gift appeared first on The Faster Times.

A nuclear “pit,” as regular readers of Focal Points know, is the heart of a nuclear weapon where the chain reaction occurs. The fight to halt the construction of a facility that’s instrumental in their manufacture is finally experiencing some success and the media, including mainstream, has been noticing. By way of background, an excerpt from a recent post of ours about the Chemistry Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility (CMRR-NF ) follows.

To Focal Points’ surprise, the New York Times addressed the facility in an editorial on October 29 titled The Bloated Nuclear Budget, which began:

“Twenty years after the end of the cold war, the United States still has about 2,500 nuclear weapons deployed and 2,600 more as backup. The Obama administration, in an attempt to mollify Congressional Republicans, has also committed to modernizing an already hugely expensive complex of nuclear labs and production facilities. [But the] country does not need to maintain this large an arsenal. … President Obama [should speed up] already negotiated reductions in deployed weapons and committing to further cuts, unilaterally if necessary.”

Including

“Halt construction of the new plutonium storage facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Costs have increased tenfold, and there are serious safety questions about the location — along a fault line and near an active volcano. Savings: $2.9 billion.”

Greg Mello is the executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group, which is leading the charge to block the CMRR-NF, via the courts. The LASG is both appealing the dismissal of its case which sought a new Environmental Impact Statement (under the National Environmental Policy Act) to address those seismic concerns and is filing a second lawsuit to the same end.

Not long after singling out the CMRR-NF for condemnation, the Times provided Mello with space for an op-ed of his own. He points out that the present plutonium facility at Los Alamos

“… which has about twice the space inside as the proposed one, already has a high-capacity manufacturing line that takes up just a third of the building. Why does the nuclear administration need to produce more pits, let alone at a faster rate? Scientists agree that the existing stock of pits will last a century or so without replacement.”

Then the American Conservative ran a story about the CMRR-NF. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos reports.

“It hasn’t been built yet—in fact, the designs aren’t even finished after 10 years. But the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) has been soaking up taxpayer money all the same as the scope of the project has metastasized.

“‘The country doesn’t have money to pour into an unnecessary, giant boondoggle that has grown beyond all original expectations,’ charges Greg Mello, executive director of the Los Alamos Study Group. … There is no doubt that the budget-cutting imperative is clashing with the old way of doing business on Capitol Hill, as pet projects and earmarks come under more scrutiny than ever. … That includes CMRR-NF, which has never been the subject of a public congressional hearing or passionate floor speech—much less a heated debate on cable TV or talk radio—but has been controversial nonetheless.’”

Finally, some good news, as relayed in the latest LASG newsletter.

“Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Judicial District ruled … in favor of the Los Alamos Study Group on a motion by the Department of Justice (DOJ) requesting dismissal of the Study Group’s appeal of a May 2011 decision by a New Mexico federal district court which allowed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) to continue working toward building [the CMRR-NF].

“The Study Group had claimed, and still claims in this appeal and in a second lawsuit filed in New Mexico federal court, that NNSA and DOE have never written an applicable environmental impact statement (EIS) for the facility … that the agencies involved are violating the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and that the project is proceeding illegally and must be halted while an applicable EIS is written. … In a separate positive ruling yesterday for Study Group in their second NEPA case in New Mexico federal court, the court denied DOJ’s attempt to transfer the new case to the Honorable Judith Herrera, who had ruled against the Study Group in the first case, the case now under appeal.”

Then, on Monday, December 5, the Associated Press addressed the CMRR-NF in an article titled Debate over $6B Los Alamos nuke lab.

“Questions continue to swirl about exactly what kind of nuclear and plutonium research will be done there, whether the lab is really necessary, and — perhaps most important — will it be safe, or could it become New Mexico’s equivalent of Japan’s Fukushima?

“As federal officials prepare the final design plans for the controversial and very expensive lab, increased scrutiny is being placed on what in recent years has been discovered to be a greater potential for a major earthquake along the fault lines that have carved out the stunning gorges, canyons and valleys that surround the premier U.S. nuclear weapons facility in northern New Mexico.”

It’s beginning to look as if the nuclear weapons-industrial complex has overreached with the CMRR-NF. We’ll give Mello the last word.

“NNSA has advanced a ‘new paradigm’ of nuclear weapons management, so far without White House endorsement, which aims at repeated upgrades and replacements to nuclear weapons on an accelerated schedule. If accepted, this ‘new paradigm’ … – which is really just the old Cold War revived – could serve as a potent narrative supporting a new arms race with Russia, a possibility which is never far away. CMRR-NF is a required gateway to that bleak and hopeless world.”

The post New Nuclear Weapons Facility: “Gateway to a Bleak and Hopeless World” appeared first on The Faster Times.

“In these grim economic times, the cost of maintaining and upgrading the United States’ aging nuclear arsenal of 5,000 warheads is certainly a ripe topic for discussion. The U.S. government has never officially disclosed the exact cost, and whether one should include environmental clean-up costs, missile defense and other programs related to nuclear weapons is a legitimate topic of debate.”

But the Obama administration objects to the figure of $700 billion that it ostensibly plans to spend on nuclear weapons over the next decade. The arms control group the Ploughshares Fund arrived at the figure, which has been cited by the media and Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.). Kessler writes:

“James Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defense, told Congress on Nov. 2 that the figure was close to $214 billion over ten years, with $88 billion being spent at the Energy Department, which maintains nuclear weapons, and more than $125 billion spent on delivery systems at the Defense Department.

“I’ve had an opportunity to look at some of the materials that were referenced in the cost estimates just before coming over here and I—without giving this more time than it deserves—suffice it to say there was double counting and some rather curious arithmetic involved,’ Miller said.”

“Without giving this more time than it deserves”? Excuse me, but if, as Kessler writes, the “U.S. government has never officially disclosed the exact cost” — never mind “whether one should include environmental clean-up costs, missile defense and other programs related to nuclear weapons [should be] a legitimate topic of debate,” does Miller really expect disarmament advocates to refrain from trying to divine the figures on their own?

When it comes to “curious arithmetic,” it seems like a case of a kettle trying to find a pot to call black. Furthermore, writes Kessler

“A big unknown question is whether the DOD figure of $125 billion really includes all of the modernization costs, as Miller suggested. … ‘It’s a little like saying it costs me $1,000 a year to operate my car, except that I am not counting the cost of insurance, repairs, registration, taxes, etc.,’ [Stephen Schwartz, editor of the Nonproliferation Review] said. ‘The actual cost is higher, maybe even much higher. But unless the folks at DOD can provide us with a breakout of the costs for each system, it’s impossible to say what’s included and what’s not.’”

As for the Ploughshares Fund figure that Rep. Markey used:

“Schwartz said that he warned Ploughshares and Markey’s office to be careful with these estimates, especially when lumping many things together. ‘Unfortunately. … Ploughshares wanted a large number to make their case for political reasons.’”

Its president, Joseph Cirincione,responded with a full explanation of how he arrived at $700 billion. Then he added:

“Because the government keeps so much of its budget hidden from the public, reasonable people can and will argue over the total costs. … In fact, it is an absolutely essential debate.

“But it needs to be a transparent debate. It is not acceptable for politicians to push their favorite programs with false, incomplete or misleading cost estimates.”

While this author has reservations about the Ploughshares Fund, it’s impossible not to agree with Cirincione. Besides, whatever the numbers, it’s just a pleasant surprise to see a discussion of the nuclear-weapons budget playing out in the media.

The post The Great $500 Billion Nuclear Debate of 2011 appeared first on The Faster Times.

Apparently, though, he failed to write them down on the palm of his hand a la Sarah Palin and was only able to remember two. Fifteen minutes later, after referring to his notes, he informed those in attendance that the third federal agency he would target was the Department of Energy. In fact, he calls for its abolition on a regular basis.

Aside from strangling government in general, why is the DOE high on the list of agencies condemned by Republicans? First, it exists to advance energy technology and innovation, which includes wind and solar, of little use to a party dependent on the funding of legacy energy like oil and gas. Also, Republicans can’t resist kicking the dead horse of Solyndra, described by the Washington Post as “the now-shuttered California company [which] had been a poster child of President Obama’s initiative to invest in clean energies and received the administration’s first energy loan of $535 million.”

It’s true, as IPS’s Robert Alvarez informs us, that “since 1990, Energy has remained prominent on the GAO’s list of high-risk federal agencies vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse.” But Perry — or his people, to be more exact — seems to have overlooked a key function of the Department of Energy. E.J. Dionne explains at the Washington Post:

“Would [Perry] scrap the department’s 17 national labs, including such world-class facilities as Los Alamos, N.M., Oak Ridge, Tenn.”

Yes, the National Nuclear Security Administration is one of the Department of Energy’s divisions. Its stated mission is to “ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile has been met through its Stockpile Stewardship Program.” Alvarez reminds us that Perry is not the first man who sought to abolish the Department of Energy while president:

“When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, one of his first goals was to abolish Energy and eliminate the government’s role in the energy sector. But he was unable to kill the department because neither he nor his supporters could figure out what to do with the country’s sprawling nuclear weapons complex, a key part of Energy’s mandate. Ever since, nuclear weapon stewardship has dominated the department’s agenda.”

Unfortunately my fantasy that shutting down the Department of Energy would deal a serious blow to the U.S. nuclear-weapons program is just that. More likely, the National Nuclear Security Administration would be privatized and wind up like Los Alamos and Lawerence Livermore Laboratory. At the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hugh Gusterson explains (no link — behind a pay wall):

“Los Alamos National Security (LANS), a consortium headed by the Bechtel Corporation with the University of California as a junior partner, won the contract [to manage Los Alamos] in 2005. A year later, it also won the contract to run the lab at Livermore. To boost profits, Bechtel increased the management fee tenfold, rewarding its senior LANS officials. The budget was static but costs increased, resulting in heavy job losses at the Livermore Laboratory.”

In other words, a privatized nuclear-weapons complex would live on, but with even more mismanagement and waste than when a division of the Department of Energy.

The post Is Rick Perry Trying to Get Rid of Nuclear Weapons? appeared first on The Faster Times.

In 2008 a WorldPublicOpinion.org poll revealed that, while 81% of Iranians favored nuclear energy, 58% agreed with the Supreme Leader’s statement, while only 23% supported a nuclear-weapons program. In fact 63% expressed approval that Iran was still party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Presumably, those polled responded truthfully. But, in light of the International Atomic Energy Agency report presenting more evidence that Iran is acquiring the know-how and technology to build nuclear weapons, who — left or right — really believes the Supreme Leader’s avowals?

Are such statements by the Supreme Leader bald-faced lies? Or is he relying on an obscure Islamic doctrinal point to justify lying to the enemy — not to mention justifying killing millions of them?

In 2003, Robert Collier of the San Francisco Chronicle attempted to divine the truth.

“Grand Ayatollah Yusef Saanei, one of the highest-ranking clerics in Iran, said in an interview: ‘There is complete consensus on this issue. It is self-evident in Islam that it is prohibited to have nuclear bombs. It is eternal law, because the basic function of these weapons is to kill innocent people’.”

But

“Some diplomats privately dismiss such statements, pointing to alleged Iranian government support for such organizations as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups whose suicide bombings have killed hundreds of innocent civilians. … Asked whether the ayatollahs could simply rip up their fatwa one day and issue a new ruling blessing the development of nuclear weapons, [Fazal Miboudi, a mullah who is professor of political science at Mofid University in Qom] said any reversal of such a high-profile issue would require years of awkward theological maneuvering.”

In fact, though, an explanation may actually exist for how the Supreme Leader could declare that nuclear weapons are forbidden by Islam while green-lighting their development. In June of this year, Tehran held its second international conference on nuclear disarmament. Despite hosting delegates from 40 nations, the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it was, for the most part, scoffed at by the West. But, at Asia Times Online, Kaveh Afrasiabi wrote:

“What seems more absurd to many is the simple fact that with the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads still in existence … so little attention has been placed in the West on practical mechanisms to achieve the lofty objective of a ‘world without nuclear weapons’. [The] gathering helped serve a purpose in terms of what [Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar] Salehi has described as cultivating a ‘popular disarmament culture’.”

As you can see, Iran was attempting to put the onus of nonproliferation back on the West for failing to take substantive disarmament measures. Afrasiabi continued.

“… the Tehran conference gave the Iranian hosts an opportunity to throw the limelight on Israel’s clandestine nuclear arsenal, its refusal to join the NPT and its lack of support for a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone — an idea fully endorsed by Iran. [Also] the Tehran conference was important in further integrating Iran in the global disarmament movement. [Emphasis added.]”

No doubt, Iran and disarmament are two words you never expected to see in the same sentence. Afrasiabi explained.

“Following this line of thought, the outlines of Iran’s ‘borderline’ nuclear policy, which allows Tehran to insert itself in the global ‘nuclear game’ and thus exert pressure on the nuclear haves to move toward disarmament and avoid proliferation activities, can be understood.”

Afrasiabi is justifying (rationalizing) Iran’s flirtation with nuclear-weapons (“‘borderline’ nuclear policy”) as a means to gain “credibility” with the West. Usually, when used in a nuclear-weapons context, the word credibility refers to a perceived need for the West, especially the United States, to initiate substantive disarmament measures to convince states aspiring to nuclear weapons that they don’t need them. Afrasiabi elaborated.

“Without the potential capability as a proto-nuclear power, Iran … will be ignored as totally irrelevant. In other words, the … value, for the sake of disarmament objectives, of Iran’s latent nuclear potential and/or threat has completely bypassed Western pundits who … often reduce Iran’s nuclear ambitions to a mere issue of national security.”

In other words, Afrasiabi is asserting that Iran is developing the capacity to build nuclear weapons in hopes that nuclear-weapons states will view it as a genuine player on the international stage. It can then institute its hitherto hidden agenda: disarmament. In Afrasiabi’s words, Iran will be “able to play an increasingly vocal role in holding those powers back from the flight of responsibility vis-a-vis their NPT obligations to disarm.”

More and more Afrasiabi resembles an Iranian-American version of North Korea mouthpiece Kim Myong Chol, who writes articles like this — North Korea nears age of affluence — for Asia Times Online. In any event, he thinks he’s demonstrated how the Supreme Leader can be pro and con nuclear weapons at the same time.

The post True Reason for Iran’s Apparent Interest in Nukes Discovered appeared first on The Faster Times.