Lebanon’s New Cabinet: Shaky from the Start

In the end, a cabinet that took five months of negotiation to assemble, nearly came apart in less than five hours. Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s Prime Minister without portfolio ever since the electoral victory of his coalition, March 14, back in June, had hardly finished his celebratory press conference, last Monday night, when one of his allies, the Phalange (or Kata’eb) Party, let it be known that they were displeased. The Phalangists were upset with their receipt of the indecorous post of Ministry of Social Affairs, but, more than that, they were frustrated with what they considered the capitulation of the majority to the Hezbollah-led opposition. With seats divided at 15 for the majority, 5 for the independent president, and 10 for the opposition, the opposition could still retain its much-decried “blocking third” (with the help of an independent), and the formation of the government was quickly perceived as a victory for Hezbollah. The assignment of seats was also criticized. (Hezbollah itself has two Ministries, Agriculture and something called “Minister of State for Administrative Development.”)

There should be no doubt by now that politics in Lebanon is not zero-sum: Losers can act like winners (see God, Party of; and the opposition’s overall success in forestalling a March-14-dominated cabinet); and winners can act like losers, too. The Phalange rebellion was just the start. On Tuesday, Michel Pharaon, a majority-aligned minister who was reappointed as one of several Ministers of State (a post that appears to be a lot like any other ministry, except without actual responsibilities), threatened to boycott the Cabinet family photo. (He eventually showed, but the Phalange minister, Selim Sayegh, did not.) And over the weekend, George Adwan, an MP with the Christian, and majority-aligned, Lebanese Forces, chimed in, telling the press that the cabinet formula did not fully reflect the outcome of the June election. He called it, accusingly, a “compromise.”

Saad Hariri’s cabinet formation process was indeed long and arduous, and at times vicious. In September, Hariri submitted a proposed line-up that was swiftly rejected by both the opposition and March 14’s Phalangist allies. He briefly resigned. Supporters despaired. “Practically from the start, the PM-designate has behaved like his coalition lost the election, going from one meeting to another, listening to every demand, threat, and insult,” the blogger and analyst Elias Muhanna (Qifa Nabki) wrote a few months ago. “Not to use a March 14 talking point, but what really is the point of winning an election if you can’t be the final arbiter of who gets what in the cabinet?”

But who said the winners would win rule unilaterally? It was hoped that the elections in June would lead to a clear winner, and a clear parliamentary majority, but what that meant for the cabinet was never fully established. (Both Hezbollah and Hariri had pledged that if their coalitions won, they would form a shared, unity government, with representation from all parties.) Moreover, the mandate was not ever as clear as many believed: March 14 won more parliamentary seats than the opposition (71 to 57), but by some measures they actually lost the popular vote, by a small margin. A hard slog was all but assured, as were unhappy concessions for all.

Meanwhile, the rhetoric over the past week reached curious proportions. “The formation of this so-called unity government is but a formality,” Osama Safa, the head of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, told the AFP. “There is but one force on the ground, regardless of who won the elections…. Nothing will happen unless Hezbollah agrees to it. They managed to get what they want, nothing can happen without them.” Ghassan Karam, an academic who blogs frequently about the region, concluded, “The country is practically ruled by the opposition while the parliamentary majority sits licking its wounds.” And Sami Gemayel, a Phalange MP, also got into the act, telling LBC Television last week, “Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri chose the current arrangement because it is better than civil war.”

Hezbollah is, it is true, the dominant military force in Lebanon, and the majority has legitimate grounds to be concerned about their extra-political influence. (In May, 2008, in the midst of a political stalemate, Hezbollah sent armed men into the streets of Beirut, violating its promise to never turn its arms against the Lebanese people. This episode, which has still not been fully examined, has also been interpreted by the majority as a sign that Hezbollah would be willing to enforce its political aims on the country by force – the threat of which, the majority argues, has already had the necessary effect.) But there also appears to be little evidence, beyond conjecture, that Hezbollah is prepared to actually take up arms over the formation of the cabinet or other legislative actions. (That is, with the probable exception of the matter of the arms themselves.)

It is not known what exactly led to the cabinet breakthrough last week, but it’s not evident that it was fear of provoking another civil war. Much of the recent analysis has focused on the demands of Michel Aoun, the leader of the Christian opposition Free Patriotic Movement. These were said to be either egotistical or conspiratorial. Aoun was concerned about the reappointment of his son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, to the Ministry of Telecommunications, through which, the latter, darker theory went, Hezbollah meant to control a vital intelligence gathering tool.

Another way of looking at things, though, was more prosaic, and more practical: The Hariri people want to privatize the mobile phone industry, and the FPM people, as a matter of policy, do not. Saad Hariri, meanwhile, was concerned about the appointment of Bassil to any ministry whatsoever — Hariri did not want any Ministers who had lost their race for Parliament in June. In the end, Aoun relented and moved Bassil to another post, but Telecommunications stayed with the opposition. (One whispered contention is that Syria, growing tired of the impasse, instructed Hezbollah to tell Aoun to back down, although if that were the case, then the conspiracy theories would seem to negate one another: why would Syria tell Aoun to give up direct control of a ministry that was vital to Hezbollah’s — and, by proxy, Syria’s — self interest?)

Of course, this is largely speculation. It’s too early to say what really ended the stalemate, and far too early to say whether Hezbollah’s weapons will impede the present government. In the meantime, the majority possesses political and economic power in abundance. It controls the cabinet and the parliament. This won’t translate to easy policy making — in the United States, where the opposition is not armed, a popular Democratic President has still struggled to pass major initiatives through a Democratic-run House and Senate – but it doesn’t have to. Compromise does not necessarily mean surrender.