For the past several weeks, the residents of Mumbai have regarded Antilia with a characteristic mix of envy, admiration and repulsion. Newspapers, magazines and prominent bloggers have adopted one of two popular sentiments: either lambasting Mukesh Ambani’s excessive spending, denouncing Antilia as an edifice of capitalist greed, or celebrating the building, named after a mythical island, as a symbol of India’s flourishing cultural capital.

Despite the warring opinions on Antilia, Mr. Ambani himself, the wealthiest man in India and fourth wealthiest man in the world, is held in high esteem across Indian society; no small feat in a country whose population is pushing 1.2 billion. Given India’s immense population, there are few things, and fewer people, who draw the Indian community to any kind of mutual agreement. As Shashi Tharoor aptly put it, India is a country that maintains consensus about how to survive without consensus. So what exactly is it about this mild-mannered, awkwardly speaking man that draws Indians across starkly divided class lines to near-unanimous respect?

For the upper echelons of society, Mukesh Ambani’s lavish new home speaks to the political, economic and cultural power that India is amassing as it gains prominence on the world stage. The four-story hanging garden, the 50-seater cinema and the multiple helipads were built with no effort to hide their ostentation. As a result, Mr. Ambani has cemented the rise of a burgeoning class of a prodigiously wealthy Indians, many of whom have few qualms when it comes to worshiping at the altar of swank.

For the expanding middle class, Mr. Ambani’s steadfast connection to his homeland (despite the fairy tale rise to wealth and power) allows the billionaire to remain rooted in a shared cultural identity. Mr. Ambani is a vegetarian, who prefers dal, chawal and roti (the traditional Indian comfort foods) above the haute cuisine of the moment. He speaks Gujarati with his wife and children and asks colleagues to join him in reciting Hindu prayers at temples during business trips. In this sense, Mr. Ambani represents a thriving mentality within Indian society; one where his heritage is in full and unapologetic blossom. As a leader often compared to Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Ambani represents this shift in attitude as only an icon of wealth and power can. It is an attitude that forgoes Indigo Deli, the SoHo-replica restaurant with imported oils from Italy, for pav bhaji from a street vendor. It is one that books a trip to Kerala instead of Spain. It is one that wears Ritu Kumar and Sabyasachi with as much pride as it does Dior and Carolina Herrera.

And while his present-day habits, his distaste for Western suits and penchant from traditional Indian comfort food, make him relatable to middle-class Indians, it is his past that firmly roots him to India’s working classes. Mukesh Ambani’s early days in a one-room tenement shared with his sizable family before the Ambani’s ascent to wealth and power connect him to the average Indian citizen. Despite the ballroom, the nine elevators, the 600-strong staff of his new residence, Mr. Ambani’s cultural habits and humble beginnings indelibly link him to the Indian population. Thus the dream is rendered tangible, the goal of wealth, power and success not as lofty as it first appeared. Perhaps this is what Antilia is; the physical representation of a dream that has been lifted from celluloid and implanted onto the city’s skyline. And in a city of so many dreams, one more doesn’t crowd.

Mukesh Ambani Photo from Wikimedia Commons.

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That’s because special relationship with America has been looking a little worn of late. A lot of Brits feel that Tony Blair foolishly threw in with George W. Bush for two poorly conceived and poorly executed wars — in Iraq and Afghanistan — but has received little, either internationally or from the U.S., in return for its sacrifice. In fact, quite the opposite. Many feel Britain’s alliance with the U.S., particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, has only damaged its standing in the world and moved the country higher up the target list for Islamic terrorists. And the U.S. hardly seemed appreciative of British efforts — U.S. military commanders complained that the British mishandled their area of operations in the southern Iraqi city of Basra and similar complaints are surfacing now from U.S. Marine commanders who have taken over from the British military in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. The relationship between Bush and Blair seemed so close, and yet so one-sided, that the British press began to refer to Blair as “Bush’s poodle” — and by extension Britain began to wonder if America simply thought of it as a lap-dog to be ordered about and kicked aside whenever it suited. The BBC quoted Kendall Myers, a  State Department analyst, as saying he felt “a little ashamed” of Bush’s treatment of Blair. Myers also said that Britain’s ability to help shape American policy — one of the alleged benefits of Britain’s “special relationship” with the world’s sole superpower — was actually next to nil. Speaking of Iraq, Myers said: “It was a done deal from the beginning, it was a one-sided relationship that was entered into with open eyes… There was nothing, no payback, no sense of reciprocity.” There were other problems as well: for instance, the U.S. refused to share critical technology with Britain on the joint strike fighter they were supposed to be building together.

Then came the Obama Administration and things seemed to go from bad to worse, especially after the BP spill. Britain-bashing was suddenly the rage — literally. And as pressure mounted on Obama to “get angry” with BP, Cameron was forced to intervene to ensure the U.S. did not force the company into bankruptcy. BP escaped that fate, but London was not happy that Obama strong-armed BP into suspending its quarterly dividend payments, thus cutting off money that British retirees and pension-funds were counting on. British officials were also suddenly being asked to testify before Congress on whether the decision to release a Libyan man convicted of plotting to blow up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, had been motivated by pressure from BP on the British government (allegedly because in exchange for the convict’s release, the Libyan government was offering BP preferential rights to newly-opened oil fields.) Add to this, a general sense around the world that America is a power in decline and it is understandable for a lot of Brits to be wondering, who needs “the special relationship”?

Now take India, the country with which Cameron wants a new “enhanced relationship.” India and Britain share a lot of history. And while Indians might resent much about their colonial past, most Indians are happy for at least some of its legacy — namely, democracy, the rule of law, the English language, cricket and a taste for Scoth (not necessarily in that order). India too has had a significant impact on Britain. It is not for nothing that chicken tikka masala is now considered Britain’s “national dish.” There is a large and vibrant Indian diaspora in Britain. Beyond that, India is clearly a rising power. In every way — economically, politically, militarily and even culturally — it is poised to play a much larger role in Asia, and in the world, than it ever has before. Britain can help India achieve some of these goals, particularly through partnerships in education, commerce, sales of military hardware and closer coordination on defense, intelligence and counter-terrorism. And unlike its relationship with the U.S., this can be a reciprocal friendship: Indian companies, like Tata Motors and Arcelor Mittal, already have major investments in the UK. More are certain to follow. India also looks like a potentially fertile investment environment for UK firms — provided India could ease some of its barriers on foreign direct investment in service industries. That is one of the reasons Cameron has been trumpeting the commercial potential of UK-India ties during his visit. It is hoped that Indian investment in Britain — as well as the growth opportunities for British companies in India — will help lift Britain out of its present economic funk.

But this relationship may also turn out to be a bit more one-sided than it first appears: India dwarfs Britain in terms of its size and may, within the next 25 years, pass it economically as well, at least in terms of total GDP (India is currently the world’s 11th largest economy while the UK is the sixth). On both trade and on helping to bolster India’s military and diplomatic power, is there anything the UK is offering India that it can’t also get from the U.S., or from other Western nations that have been lining up to do business with New Delhi? One Indian diplomat told me last week that India already had a “strategic partnerships” of one kind or another with 26 nations. Will its relationship with Britain really stand out as “first among equals” — or will it just be another country with which India has friendly ties?

Now, what about the idea that Britain’s special relationship with India will become more important than — or even equally important as — its special relationship with the U.S.? I think that’s unlikely for the following reasons:

Britain is a nation that punches above its weight in diplomatic affairs. Why is that? Well, Britain has a skilled diplomats, but that isn’t the reason. Some of it has to do with Britain’s status as a nuclear weapons state and its place among the Big Five on the UN Security Council. Some of it also has to do with the fact that Britain, unlike many other countries its size, has — at least for the time being — a blue water Navy and a truly expeditionary military. Some of it has to do with Britain’s former Empire — which means that it has close historical ties to many countries in Asia and Africa dating back to its “the sun never sets” days. But I would argue that much of Britain’s enhanced power in world affairs has to do with its “special relationship” with the United States. Because of that relationship, many nations have come to regard Britain as a kind of proxy for America. And while that assumption is often incorrect and has at times hurt Britain’s reputation (see: poodle), I would argue that it has generally improved Britain’s stature in world affairs. By coordinating much of what it does on the really big international issues with America, Britain has multiplied its own force in international affairs many times over. And the perception that Britain can influence U.S. thinking and policy– even when it proves not to be the case — still gives the UK increased diplomatic standing with other nations.

Thanks to the special relationship, Britain has positioned itself as an essential nation — the one country that can serve as an “Atlantic bridge,” interpreting America to Europe and Europe to America. The Americans count on the British to help nudge Europe in their direction, and the Europeans count on the British to help pull the Americans a few steps in their’s. This honest broker role is important — again, even when in cases where it turns out not to, in fact, be true. The enduring perception that the UK can play this role, has made Britain a very important player in European affairs.

For both of these reasons, I was not at all surprised by Tony Blair’s decision to back the U.S. in the Iraq War. In fact, I don’t think he had any real choice from a geopolitical standpoint. After all, if Britain defied the U.S., what would it be? Just another European country. Britain did not go to war in Iraq because of WMD. Britain went to war in Iraq to preserve the special relationship.

And, while American power may be declining to some degree, the U.S. remains, in the words of former U.S. secretary of state Madeline Albright, the world’s “indispensable nation.” While the U.S. cannot do everything on its own, neither can very much be done in the world without American involvement. And while that is also increasingly true of the big emerging market powers — China and India, and to some extent Brazil and Russia (thanks to what Fareed Zakaria terms “The Rise of the Rest”), America still enjoys greater freedom of unilateral action than most other nations on the planet. In other words, for Britain, it is probably worth it still be BFF with the US of A.

Now does Britain get any of these benefits from its “enhanced relationship” with India? I don’t think so. While having Britain’s backing in world affairs might enhance India’s diplomatic stature, what does India’s support do for Britain? Not all that much. It certainly doesn’t  logarithmically enhance Britain’s role in the world — which is what I would argue the special relationship with the U.S. does for the UK. And while Britain may need India for economic reasons, on what issue is the UK essential to India? There is also, despite all the happy talk about cultural harmony, quite a big gap between India’s thinking on a lot of international issues and the melding of the minds that has often characterized Anglo-US relations.

So maybe this “special relationship” with India won’t be so special after all. To which, Indians and Britons can console themselves: at least we’ll always have chicken tikka masala.

*Full Disclosure and Safe Harbor Clause: My wife is a British diplomat but the views expressed here — both brilliant and stupid — are entirely my own.

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On a related note, The Wall Street Journal today has a good item on the fact that not only is Than Shwe visiting India right now, but so is British Prime Minister David Cameron, who has brought with him a huge delegation of Cabinet ministers and British business leaders. The Journal points out how the two contemporaneous visits of these very different leaders to India tells one a lot about the dual nature of India’s foreign policy and position in the world. I would quibble only in the sense that the dualism in Indian foreign policy that the Journal highlights is actually less contradictory than the Journal makes out. The whole reason that India needs Burmese natural gas is because its economy is booming — and that booming economy is one of the prime reasons the British Prime Minister is so interested in forging a new “special relationship” with India. India is also interested in Burma because it wants to check Chinese influence, and this too is sort of the flip-side of India’s own growing military strength and world profile. As it becomes a more important world player, it is bumping up against the other global player and emerging economic superpower in the region: China. Places like Burma become zones where China and India compete for influence. But India’s emerging military and strategic importance are also a reason for Britain’s desire to refresh its historically-close ties to New Delhi.

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But let’s face it. Anderson is now 89-years old. (He reportedly lives in Bridgehampton on Long Island.) It is extremely unlikely that he will ever be brought to India to be tried. Never mind who made him the promise of immunity, the fact is that the only reason Anderson ever came to Bhopal in the first place was because the government had said it wouldn’t arrest him. And, while I’m all for the principle that the buck stops at the top, there really is very little evidence that I’m aware of that Anderson himself should be held criminally liable for the Bhopal gas leak. (Greenpeace issued a report saying that Anderson knew about problems at the Bhopal plant and that Union Carbide had corrected the same issues at an identical U.S. plant but allowed them to go unmitigated in India. But Union Carbide has always maintained it fixed the problems at both plants prior to the 1984 leak.) Also how hard is India really going to push for Anderson’s extradition? Isn’t the case just an unwelcome irritant for New Delhi in what it hopes is an increasingly close diplomatic and strategic relationship with Washington? Frankly, the media’s focus on Anderson is a witch hunt — and the Indian press ought to know better.

The focus on Anderson is also a red herring. It’s a red herring because it distracts from what the Indian press ought to be doing. One of those things I’ve highlighted here before: namely, focusing on the failures of the Indian judicial system, which is too overloaded with cases to allow justice to be delivered swiftly or surely.

But the other thing which the Indian media ought to be doing is trying to identify and expose the next Bhopal before it happens. This point was hammered home this week by two stories: first, a chlorine gas cylinder in Mumbai leaked, sending more than 100 people to the hospital. Then today, nearly 30 people were sickened by methane leaking from a steel plant in West Bengal. The media is already asking who is to blame for these leaks. Which is fair enough. But real investigative reporting should try to identify potential problems before people are sickened or die – and then shame corporations and regulators into fixing them. The Indian media consistently fails to do this. Perhaps Indian news outlets are too afraid of angering powerful corporations, many of which are also advertisers. But the next time a massive industrial accident kills thousands in this country, perhaps it is the media that  should be put on trial for criminal negligence.

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I take Russ’s points about the bankruptcy of the current non-proliferation regime. It is absolutely true that the Bush administration gutted the NPT as soon as it decided to let India out of the nuclear dog house and secured India’s country-specific exemption from the NSG. After doing that, it makes it much harder to strengthen the NPT or enforce sanctions against Iran. But I think Russ misrepresents or elides the real reasons the Bush team did this. And he also miss some crucial differences between India and other “rogue states”:

India, as Russ says, never signed the NPT. But Iran did. And that is why it is still logically consistent to impose sanctions against Iran and combat its attempt to develop a nuclear program, while allowing India to possess nuclear weapons. (In fact, this is the position that Indian diplomats take on this issue.)

What’s more, even though it never signed the NPT, India – like Israel, but unlike Pakistan or North Korea — has a fantastic record on non-proliferation. There is absolutely no evidence India has ever tried to transfer or sell nuclear weapons technology to a third party. Meanwhile, Pakistan had A.Q. Khan – who was basically selling plans and equipment for an enrichment cycle and bombs to whoever would pay. The Bush people who gutted the NPT did so intentionally not inadvertently and they did so for reasons I will explain in a moment. But India’s actual proliferation record was clearly part of why the Bush team felt confident in seeking an exemption for India from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Russ cites Andrew Lichterman and M.V. Ramana as claiming that the reason the US decided to embrace India as a nuclear power and seek an NSG exemption for them was that U.S. multinationals wanted to use it as a wedge to open India up for further business. But this isn’t the main reason behind the Bush administration’s policy toward India’s nuclear program. Instead, the U.S. stance was part of a larger effort to position India as a capable, strategic regional rival to China. The idea is that a stronger India would serve as a check on Chinese dominance in the region. And making India more equivalent with China meant creating an India with both nuclear weapons, and a viable nuclear power industry to make sure it has adequate electricity to meet its power and infrastructure develop goals. Also, the good will generated by the nuclear deal, was supposed to drive Delhi into Washington’s embrace, making it a more vital regional ally which could be counted on to support the US both in the region and in international bodies.

Overall, the Bush administration viewed foreign policy not through traditional, realist “balance of power” politics that focuses on state’s “capabilities,” but through a focus on state’s “intentions.” (In this way, it actually borrowed quite a lot from the school of American foreign policy that is usually labeled “idealist.” This is an insight that my friend Peter Scoblic points out to great effect in his indictment of conservative foreign policy, Us Vs. Them.) Interestingly, the NPT, while often seen as the achievement of dovish, idealist, peacenicks, actually takes as its premise a hard-headed, realist focus on capabilities. Intentions don’t come into it.

The Bush people, though, decided that this was part of what was wrong with the current non-proliferation regime. It lumped India, which had never been guilty of proliferating, in the same camp as Pakistan, which was selling nukes to all comers. And where was the danger of loose nukes ending up in the wrong hands greater: in Pakistan (which is facing a multi-front civil war with various sets of Islamic extremists while the intelligence services work hand in glove with other Islamic terrorists) or in Russia (which is part of the NPT as a nuclear power but which has a lot of unsecured nuclear material and which has a class of under-employed, impoverished, and mercenary scientists and military officials and a huge organized crime problem) or India (where, despite the country’s poverty and sometimes poor security, there is absolutely no evidence of either proliferation on the part of Indian scientists or any evidence that nuclear material is likely to fall into the wrong hands)?

So the Bush administration — one could argue rightly or wrongly — decided to focus on risks and intentions, and not on mere capabilities. I personally see some real downsides to this approach. But I don’t think  Russ strengthens his case by misrepresenting India’s record or the rationale the Bush administration used when it pushed for India’s NSG exemption.

After all, there is something wrong when Russia is considered a good guy when it comes to proliferation and India is considered a bad guy. And when Pakistan and India are held to be equivalent on this issue. (India and Pakistan are great rivals, but this is not some he said-she said, where both sides are equally to blame. Pakistan is by far the more worrisome country and while it is fine to say that Pakistan can never be reformed so long as it sees a threat from India, it is unfair to shift the burden for changing this perception entirely on to India’s shoulders. Pakistan needs to be convinced that it has far more existential threats within its own country than any threat posed by India.)

Perhaps it would be better to allow all these “rogue states” to join the NPT as nuclear powers, but then commit the entire world through the NPT to a disarmament program aimed at a true, nuclear-free future. But of course, that would require the US (and China and Russia) to be willing to give up their nuclear deterrent entirely. And that’s not going to happen, is it?

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