There are, however, some common themes across these issues which frame the broader U.S. role in the the Middle East.  All three of these cases demonstrate the inability of the U.S to get what it wants from other countries in the region.  Iran and the U.S. have not had a good relationship for decades so it is no surprise that the U.S. has proven unsuccessful in its efforts to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear weapons plan.

The other two cases are, at least in this regard, more significant.  Despite an an aversion, until recently, to being frank about the violence and brutality of the Assad regime, the U.S. has been completely unable to influence Assad’s behavior as he has taken increasingly violent measures against his own people.  Of equal import is the inability of the U.S. to persuade permanent members  of the UN Security Council, China and Russia to support the resolution asking Assad to resign.

Egypt is, in some respects, the most intriguing of the three cases.  The decision of the Egyptian authorities to detain people working with major American democracy assistance organizations is very unusual, particularly for a country that, like Egypt, enjoys a good relationship with, and receives ample assistance from, the U.S.  In this context the failure of Egypt to release those prisoners in the face of mounting pressure from the U.S. is even more puzzling.

The U.S. is asking, without success, for the Iranian, Syrian, Russian and Chinese governments to do things that, from their perspective, are not in their interests.  It is not really a big surprise that Iran is not giving up their weapons because the U.S. wants them to or that Moscow and Beijing are less anxious than the U.S. to call for a leader to resign because he has used excessive force on the citizens of his own country.  The U.S., on the other hand, is asking Egypt to do something that is neither against their interests nor a very big request.

The new government of Egypt probably does not share the American view that the involvement of U.S. based organizations working to help make Egypt become more democratic is essential for Egypt’s development.  Moreover, Egyptians may see the U.S. as having supported Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian government rather than as having played a role in political breakthroughs in Egypt.  However, the Egyptian government, which still seems happy to receive assistance from the U.S. and to have relatively strong ties with the U.S. in other areas, notably the military, has behaved clumsily and excessively on this issue.  It is unclear why the presence of U.S. democracy organizations which most governments in similar situations view as a minor, but necessary, inconvenience has drawn such an overblown and hostile response from the Egyptian government.

The failure of the U.S. to stop Egypt from detaining, and now possibly trying, these nineteen Americans is yet another case of the U.S. not being able to persuade a recipient of U.S. assistance to cooperate with the U.S.  Recipients of U.S. assistance, particularly when they are large and powerful countries like Egypt cannot be expected to support the U.S. on everything, but this is a relatively minor, although highly symbolic, incident where Egyptian cooperation does not seem like it should be beyond the expectations of the U.S.

The inability of the U.S. to get what it wants in the Middle East on issues both relatively large and relatively minor is further evidence of the failure of American policy of continuing to behave like a lone superpower in an increasingly multi-polar world.  China and Russia are almost certainly going to continue charting their own courses in the Middle East and elsewhere and so will continue to be able to block U.S. action on the security council and to offer regimes, including those as dreadful as the ones in Teheran and Damascus, alternatives to cooperating with the U.S.  This is probably unavoidable in a multi-polar world, but events like those in Egypt raise a different set of concerns and limits on American influence and power.

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The lack of freedoms of media, association and speech in Russia means that the March election cannot be truly free, fair and competitive.  These enormous problems notwithstanding, Putin may in fact be the most popular candidate on the ballot.  However, it is still possible that Putin and his organization will seek to inflate his margin of victory to make him seem stronger and that election fraud will spill over into election day and the post-election counting rather than simply pre-election intimidation and similar behaviors.  If the parliamentary elections can be viewed as a precedent, a reasonable proposition, than it is likely that there will be election fraud before, during and after March 4th, and that there will also be large demonstrations in Moscow and possibly elsewhere in Russia following the presidential election.

It is still difficult to know where these demonstrations will lead, but they will raise some challenges for the Obama administration and the U.S.  The U.S. was behind he curve in recognizing the seriousness of the citizen uprisings in North Africa last year, but Russia is a different country where a different set of issues and concerns confront the administration.

The dilemma itself is not very complicated.  While the U.S. would like to see liberalization and political change in Russia, it cannot be seen as being too strong in its opposition to the Putin regime.  This would damage U.S.-Russia relations and possibly push Russia towards a more anti-U.S. foreign policy.  It would also undermine the Russian opposition by making Putin’s inevitable attack on them on the grounds of being American proxies or stooges more resonant.  However, if the U.S. does not support the demonstrators, their is a risk that the U.S. will miss an opportunity to help make change in Russia and will demonstrate that the U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights is inconsistent.

The Obama administration will need to strike a balance, at first offering rhetorical support for the principles of fair elections, free media and the right to demonstrate and rallying international support for more democracy in Russia, while avoiding a confrontation with the Russian government or offering sufficient support to the demonstrators that the movement is tarred as being an American creation and thus fatally weakened.  As the post-election scenario evolves, the U.S. will need to be flexible enough to adjust their tactics as needed.  This approach probably cannot be executed perfectly, but it may be the best the U.S. can do.

The U.S. response to events in Russia in March will be complicated by another presidential election, the one in the U.S.  While President Obama will have to respond to events in Russia in a thoughtful way taking into consideration a range of issues, Republicans will use these events as an opportunity to portray Obama as soft on Russia.  Talking tough on Russia will be a good way for likely Republican nominee Mitt Romney to strengthen his support in at least one part of the Republican base.

Unlike Obama, Romney and the Republicans do not have to govern, or worry about the consequences of what they say.  Therefore, they will be able to take strong, and politically popular anti-Russia positions with little regard for the potential impact of their statements and positions.  The Republicans have spent most of the last three years seeking to portray Obama as weak.  Tough posturing on Russia will be another way for Romney to make this argument.  Republicans in congress will only be too happy to join in as well.

This may in the short term make opponents of Putin, both in Russia and the U.S. feel good, but it will accomplish little.  The Republican rhetoric, despite not coming from the administration itself will make it easier for the Russian regime to scapegoat American intervention, will raise expectations of the Russian opposition that cannot be met by any American administration and, by further damaging U.S.-Russia relations will reduce whatever remaining influence the U.S. has on Russia’s leadership.  The Obama administration has, differentiated itself from its predecessor by prioritizing results over bluster.  This is the administration, after all that talked about the war on terror less, but killed Osama Bin Laden.  Going back to prioritizing tough talk may make some feel better, and even give Romney a temporary bump in the polls, but it will accomplish little.

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In 2008 Barack Obama captured the idealism and hope of people both inside and outside the U.S. in an election that renewed people’s faith in democracy and in America.  None of the candidates this year, including President Obama who is, of course, seeking reelection, is inspiring very much idealism and hope.  Moreover, for much of the Republican primary period, the dialog, particularly on foreign policy, has felt like a competition to see who could produce the most jingoistic bluster.  That phase seems to have receded as the race has narrowed to two serious candidates and two others.

There are, nonetheless, reasons why this election, as depressing as it has been for some, also demonstrates the strength and value of democracy.  First, after a three or so year period of increasingly heated rhetoric and personal attacks on the president, the need to win votes has, surprisingly, tempered some of this rhetoric.  The most confrontational, angry and intolerant candidates have fallen by the wayside.  The exception to this is Rick Santorum, who is about as intolerant as any major figure in American politics, and is also about ten days away from seeing the end of his political career and returning to his richly deserved Google infamy.  Overall, the election has, perhaps surprisingly, acted as a moderating force for the Republican candidates.  Newt Gingrich and Mitt Romney, the two leading candidates, have had to moderate their rhetoric as the election has moved from small states to bigger ones.  This will continue as the general election approaches.

Second, while the Republican primary has at times felt like a political reality television show with several candidates that are demonstrably unqualified to run a grocery store, let alone a country, and who have expressed a hatred and contempt for the current President that borders on pathological, the campaign has proceeded as planned.  In the American context, this seems completely normal, but in other countries it is easy to imagine candidates as axiomatically unqualified as Herman Cain being kept off the ballot, or candidates as committed to the destruction of the president as Rick Perry or Michele Bachmann portrayed as treasonous and pushed out of politics.  It seems obvious, but  the inclusion of these types of radical candidates is evidence of the strength of the American system, while their demise is evidence that the best solutions to problems of democracy is often more democracy.

A central aspect of democracy is that voters must be allowed to make mistakes.  While the American people do not need to make a mistake on the scale of, for example electing Newt Gingrich President, to demonstrate this to the rest of the world, the campaign to this point has shown that the American system allows for mistakes to happen.  Recent history has also show that the key to ameliorating the impact of these mistakes is to keep institution such as free press and regular elections strong.

It is easy to see the strengths of a democratic system when inspiring or otherwise extraordinary candidates win elections, but this is not likely to happen in the U.S. in 2012. The most likely outcome is that the president, who is no longer the extraordinary persona he was in 2012, will be reelected, but it is possible that Mitt Romney, an even less inspiring politician, will unseat President Obama.  Accordingly, the world will not see the American system give rise to an inspiring candidate or even an inspiring narrative this year.  Instead, the U.S. election, which has already, given a stage to a handful of narrow-minded candidates seemingly unaware of most of the rest of the world, will likely produce an ugly race between two deeply imperfect figures.  This too is part of the story, even the strength, of democracy.  Democracy sometimes produces mediocrity or worse, but the process is nonetheless significant.  The ability to endure and keep the country relatively peaceful even when many of the politicians themselves are not up to the task is also democracy’s strength.  This is the lesson from the U.S. in 2012.

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It is also possible that the U.S. does not really want good elections in Georgia, but simply issued that statement because that is the kind of thing which is expected of the U.S.  This, however, is unlikely in regards to Georgia where fair elections and stronger democracy are essential pre-requisites for the U.S. to achieve its interests.  The American goals of bringing Georgia into NATO, and solidifying Georgia’s role as a stable U.S. ally in a tumultuous region would be much easier to achieve if Georgia could demonstrate, particularly to Europe, that it is moving towards democracy.

The U.S. and their European and other democratic allies have two primary approaches to improving elections in countries that like Georgia are neither democratic nor totalitarian and are not enemies of the west.  The first approach is to monitor the election.  The tools and institutions used for monitoring elections are professional and sophisticated able to not only determine the extent to which an election was free and fair, but to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a particular election.  However, these organizations are empowered to monitor elections, not to intervene in them or improve them.  Thus, in many cases the primary achievement of international monitoring groups, or domestic monitoring groups supported by western donors is to identify whether an election was good or not.  In many cases they are largely reaffirming impressions which were widespread before the election, or documenting how an election which was expected to be bad was, in fact, bad

The second approach is to provide technical support to the country conducting the election.  The U.S. government’s statement about Georgia, for example, was followed by a commitment to spend $1 million to improve the voter lists in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi.  Similar projects in various countries focus on technical issues such as providing ink to mark voters, purchasing transparent ballot boxes or supporting endless discussions about revising the election law.  The problems with these approaches are that they offer answers to problems that are often not very salient or propose technical solutions to problems that are, in most cases, largely political.

The major obstacles to fair elections in countries like Georgia, for example, are not poor voter lists, or lack of quality election equipment, although these are often problems in some countries, but the reality that governments are not prepared to conduct elections in a way that makes it possible that they might lose.  Accordingly, technical solutions can only have a limited impact on election fairness in these countries, but they remain appealing because they are easy to fund and implement and rarely create problems with the government of the country having the elections.

It is not clear that the U.S. is able to influence the degree of election fairness in entrenched semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian regimes, but it is clear that the current approaches are no longer sufficient.  The tools which are necessary to push countries to better elections are no longer simply help with election lists and other straightforwardly technical tactics, but include things like concrete political pressure linked to consequences, a willingness to publicly urge foreign leaders to conduct fair elections, and intervene more frequently when government abuses occur in the pre-election period.  The politics of doing these things in countries that are allies is very complicated.  It is unlikely, for example, that the U.S. government in Washington or Tbilisi is going to link assistance to Georgia, a country that has more than 1,000 troops in Afghanistan, to fair elections, or that leaders of American allies will be publicly chastised for things like arresting opposition activists or threatening opposition supporters, but unless the U.S. is willing to do these things, its ability to push countries to better elections will be severely limited.

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Only a few moments later Romney, again speaking about the President stated “He wants to turn America into a European-style entitlement society…The President takes his inspiration from the capitals of Europe.”  In the speech’s closing statement, Romney referred to “the worst of what Europe has become.”  Romney, only moments after pledging to be all but uncritical of America’s friends chastised, to put it mildly, Europe.   There are two possible explanations for this.  Either Romney cannot follow the not very rigorous logic of his own assertions, or he does not consider European countries to be friends of the U.S.  Neither one of these is a comforting explanation.

While Romney is not the first Republican to use anti-European rhetoric in this manner, he is also no longer just a Republican politician.  He is one of the two people most likely to be president of the U.S. in 53 weeks.  Coming from a potential president, these kinds of jibes against Europe should be seen differently.  Romney may legitimately believe that European style social democracy is bad for the U.S., or as is more likely, believe that caricaturing European policies is much easier than explaining his party’s policies of anti-poor class warfare of the last generation.  Nonetheless, it is very dangerous for an American president to not have a full understanding of the value of the U.S. relationship with many European countries, or to jeopardize that relationship through over-heated campaign slogans.

Romney’s speech also reflects a view of what constitutes a friend that is worth exploring.  Israel and the U.S. obviously enjoy a very close relationship, but it is a relationship that is also characterized by an enormous amount of foreign assistance flowing to Israel from the U.S.  Accordingly, Israel, unlike, for example, Germany or the U.K., needs the U.S. to an extent that precludes meaningful Israeli criticism of, or disagreement with, the U.S.  A similar dynamic exists between the U.S. and other states which are major recipients of U.S. assistance, for example, Georgia.  Romney’s view of friendship suggests that the U.S. should remain close only with those countries which, out of geopolitical necessity, must be almost entirely pro-U.S.  European countries, particularly those in western Europe, however, are not really friends, in his view, because they occasionally differ the U.S. and have different approaches to regulating capitalism.  This is an odd and limited understanding of friendship, and a destructive approach to foreign policy.

The U.S. should value all of its allies, not just those who are too dependent on the U.S. to be able to criticize it.  Moreover, demonizing the domestic policies of all European countries is extremely narrow-minded and demonstrates an unwillingness to explore policy options.  The U.S. should not necessarily try to be like Europe, but to view it as axiomatically impossible that a European country would have a policy worth emulating will limit U.S. ability to apply good solutions to a range of problems in areas such as the environment, infrastructure or education.

It also remains true that despite differences on economic policies, some foreign policy issues, and the role of religion in society, the powerful countries of western Europe remain the the most important and useful allies the U.S. has.  Combating Jihadist terror, addressing climate change-whether or not Romney believes in it-, getting the global economy back on track and supporting human rights and democracy, among other 21st century foreign policy challenges the U.S. faces will be exponentially more difficult without European cooperation.  We can only hope that Romney must know this, and that his speech in New Hampshire can be ignored.

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The UNM has generally drawn its power from several sources.  First, they are a reasonably popular political party.  Many Georgians have either been pleased about the reforms the Georgian government under the UNM’s stewardship have enacted, support the UNM on various issues or believe that the UNM is best able to move Georgia forward in a good direction.  This is one of the reasons that the UNM has been the most popular party in Georgia in virtually every poll taken since the Rose Revolution.

This is, however, only one explanation of the UNM’s success in Georgia.  Since coming to power the UNM has, according to most international watchdog organizations, limited media freedoms while civil society has been weakened, although this has begun to change in recent years.  Moreover, while elections have not been characterized by widespread fraud and chaos on Election Day, the UNM has abused administrative resources and used threats and intimidation to limit the influence of some opposition parties.  In this environment, the popularity and electoral victories of the UNM should be viewed somewhat differently-at least as much of as a residue of undemocratic elements of the system, than evidence of genuine and democratic support.

Another significant reason for the ongoing popularity and dominance of the UNM has been the Georgian opposition itself.  Much of the opposition, not surprisingly that part which is usually highlighted by the government and government run media, is given to political histrionics, unreasonable demands, murky relationships with Moscow and often bafflingly poor political judgment.  The more serious parts of the Georgian opposition, notably Irakli Alasania’s Free Democrats, have generally had limited access to resources and media.  Much of the media remains heavily influenced by the Georgian government, while support for a serious and legitimate opposition party by wealthy individuals or businesses can create problems for those individuals and businesses in Georgia’s crony capitalist economy.

The Georgian government has very cleverly exploited this situation, frequently complaining to both foreign and domestic audiences that Georgia lacks a serious and powerful opposition.  The government has, of course, complained about the opposition being too weak while simultaneously working to ensure that this remains the case.  Thus, the Georgian government has been able to deflect criticisms of one party dominance by arguing the self-fulfilling prophecy that due to the UNM’s popularity nobody was able to pose a plausible challenge.  This explanation has been useful and accurate for several years.

About three months ago, however, that suddenly changed, causing tremendous concern in Tbilisi.  The Georgian government after years of arguing that the opposition was too weak and too poor, almost overnight had to argue that that opposition was now too strong, and more pertinently, too rich.  The reason for this was the announcement by Georgian billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, in September, that he was going to become involved in politics and that he would work closely with, and help fund, the Free Democrats and the Republicans, two Georgian opposition parties who fall on the more rational, mature and moderate end of the Georgian opposition political spectrum.  Almost overnight, the Georgian government had to contend with an opposition that can use resources and afford the same kind of expensive modern campaign and infrastructure that in recent Georgian elections has only been within the provenance of the UNM.

The Georgian government has responded to Ivanishvili’s entrance into politics not by welcoming a worthy opponent who could help funnel resources to ensure that different political views were heard, but by seeking to weaken Ivanishvili and limit his ability to influence politics.  The ways the government has sought to do this include stripping Ivanishivili of his citizenship, and passing a new party finance law that would not only limit the billionaire’s ability to give money to political parties, but may also require the Free Democrats and Republicans to give back money they have already received.

Obviously, Ivanishvili tilts the scales in Georgia in a way that is more extreme than wealthy candidates like Michael Bloomberg or Mitt Romney in the U.S., but the Georgian government’s efforts to push him out of politics entirely demonstrates that the canard about the opposition being too weak was meant to explain away the government’s lack of interest in democracy rather than as a true lamentation of the relative state of Georgia’s political forces.  It is not yet clear the extent to which the government will succeed in limiting Ivanishvili’s role, but it is reasonably clear that the Georgian government will likely continue to describe oppositions as too weak or too strong and, unlike Goldilocks, never find the one that is just right for them.

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While it is clearly too early to know what will happen in Russia, there are several aspects to the current situation in Russia which could become increasingly significant as the current political crisis in Russia unfolds.  First, when faced with a domestic political crisis, leaders often seek to identify an external enemy at whose feet to lay the blame for internal problems.  This can take the form of rhetoric and propaganda, but it can also manifest itself through military actions.  The Russian regime has already sought to increase its anti-American rhetoric, as it has done periodically throughout the last decade or so.  This time, this approach has not been very effective.  Efforts by Putin to depict the demonstrations as a western conspiracy have largely failed.

It is still possible that Putin will pursue a more dangerous route by seeking to bolster his regime through a conflict with one of Russia’s many neighbors.  The most obvious candidate for this type of conflict would be Georgia.  Russia and Georgia fought a brief war in 2008; and tensions and animosity between the two states and their leaders remain quite high.  Additionally, Russian troops remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, regions that are viewed by Georgia, and most of the rest of the world, as part of Georgia.  The possibility of conflict between these two states is exacerbated by the presence of a hyper-nationalist regime in Tbilisi that is also battling decreasing popularity and growing domestic opposition.  Any conflict between Russia and one of its neighbors could be devastating for the countries involved and, particularly if it involves a country like Georgia, could pull the U.S., in one way or another, into another far flung conflict.

A second aspect to the recent events in Russia is that it not only has created a crisis for Russia’s regime, but has raised similar questions and concerns for other non-democratic leaders in the region.  In recent years, Russia has emerged as a model for semi-authoritarian and kleptocratic regimes throughout much of the former Soviet Union.  These regimes have learned much about how to limit free media, crack down on  freedom of expression and assembly, co-opt political opposition, and distribute private wealth among supporters of the administration from Russia.  As leaders from Belarus to the Caucasus to Central Asia see that Putin’s regime is imperiled they will soon understand that their own non-democratic regimes may not be as stable as they would like.  These regimes, depending on how things develop in Russia could crack down further on opposition, or, more unlikely, begin to liberalize in order to hold on to some power a little longer.  In either case, if Putin does not survive his travails in Russia, leaders throughout the region will be forced to reevaluate their own policies and ambitions for remaining in office indefinitely.

If Putin is unable to maintain in power in Russia, it will also raise some questions for U.S. policy in the region.  The end of Putin’s powerful and oppressive regime would raise the possibility of further democratic development in Russia.  This would create a strong impetus for greater U.S. involvement and expenditure in Russia. However, the U.S. has invested in democratic development in Russia in the past and met with little success.  The end of the Putin regime would create an opportunity for more democracy in Russia, but there would be no guarantees.

The U.S. has a long and mixed record of supporting democracy and human rights in Russia.  The end of the Putin regime would be a great opportunity to pursue the next phase of this endeavor, but it also represents an opportunity to learn from previous mistakes and recognize how agonizingly slow and difficult democratic development in Russia can be.  Moreover, the U.S. no longer has the resources needed to commit fully to building democracy in post-Putin Russia, should it come to that.

The resolution of the current crisis of the Russian regime will have an impact far beyond Russia.  It could frame political developments and even conflict between states in the former Soviet Union for the next several years and may force the U.S. to rethink and reevaluate its own Russia policy.  Putin’s Russia has created numerous challenges for the U.S., but the transition away from Putinism, should it occur, while welcome, will raise a different set of challenges.

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For example, the administration has avoided making too many strong statements about the current situation in Russia which would strengthen Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s narrative that the problem in Russia is excessive intervention by the American government, rather than excessive authoritarianism and election fraud by the Russian government.  Similarly, although the Obama administration was, at times, frustratingly silent during the early days of the protests in Egypt, and displayed far more confidence than was deserved in the interest various North African autocrats held in reforming, the outcomes have been positive.  In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak resigned; and in Libya, Moammar Gaddafi was forced from office.

The problem the Obama administration faces, both politically and substantively, is that while it has numerous foreign policy accomplishments to which it can point, the whole to which they add up remains less than the sum of its parts.  For example, while the killing of Bin Laden is something about which Americans are rightfully happy, and the conclusion of the military effort in Iraq, while almost a decade late and a few trillion dollars short, is also a good thing for the U.S., the overall impact these things have on American security, stability in South Asia or the Middle East or other related issues is less clear.

This is partially due to the vexing nature of these problems.  The war in Iraq, for example, had created a range of problems that could not be easily solved by the U.S. beginning in 2009.  Similarly, killing Bin Laden was never on its own going to eliminate the threat of Jihadist terror, but there are other factors to be considered as well.  The Obama administration’s occasionally cautious approach to foreign policy necessitates downplaying both expectations and accomplishments.  Thus, the absence of sweeping statements and ambitious goals can be frustrating to American audiences, but often lead to better outcomes.

On the other hand, this unwillingness to set ambitious or creative goals has contributed to the administration’s inability to consider bolder decisions and approaches.  The killing of Bin Laden, for example, does not change the situation in Afghanistan where Obama has talked himself, and the country, into a war that continues with no clear end, or even goals, in sight.  Similarly, the administration’s commitment to a U.S. position as a global hegemon spending billions of dollars it no longer has in this endeavor reflects a commitment to conventional, and increasingly unsustainable approaches to foreign policy.

In this context, the accomplishments of the Obama administration will never seem satisfactory, either to opponents of the administration who seek out any opportunity to criticize the president, but more significantly, to observers who cannot help but note the distressing state of international affairs despite several high profile successes by the administration.

For Obama to craft a foreign policy that sews together his impressive accomplishments in a way that more concretely makes the U.S. stronger and more secure, the administration will have to demonstrate a willingness to move away from the received Washington wisdom and the logic of the foreign policy bureaucracy, and develop an approach to foreign policy that reflects the new fiscal realities at home and multi-lateral nature of the world today.  This will not be easy, but if the U.S. does not do this, its role in the world will be reduced anyway, but definitively not on America’s terms.

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Putin’s strongman regime has long drawn its legitimacy not from winning free, fair and competitive elections, but by the popularity of Putin himself and the strength of the regime.  Both of these things are now drawn into question by the poor showing of Putin’s United Russia party in the polls and the newly discovered increased willingness on the part of ordinary Russians to protest against Putin’s rule.  Even if these protests do not lead to any significant change, the people of Russia may no longer view Putin’s rule as inevitable or unassailable.  Accordingly, the Russian government will have to respond to these demonstrations either by liberalizing somewhat or by taking a more authoritarian turn.  The latter approach is considerably more likely, but even that offers little guarantee of stability for Putin and his supporters.  The current demonstrations, after all, occurred in spite of an increasingly unfree media and civic environment in Russia.  Limiting these freedoms even more will not be easy, especially now.

Nonetheless, extrapolating frustration with the corruption, misrule, election fraud and declining economic fortunes associated with Putin’s regime to mean a desire for liberal democratic governance in Russia, however, would be a mistake.  It should be kept in mind that the party that came in second in the recent parliamentary election was the Communist Party, while western oriented liberal parties did not do particularly well in the election.  Many of the demonstrators may be western oriented , but among elements of the broader Russian population who share their critique of Putin, political sympathies are notably different.

The demonstrations that are now occurring are also significant because, Putin’s protestations notwithstanding, the U.S. has not been a driving force behind these demonstrations.  Restrictions in recent years on Russian organizations receiving funding from western donors, the ability of American NGOs to function in Russia and even on western election monitors for this election, have combined to significantly limit the potential impact of the west in post-election scenarios in Russia.  In this regard, Moscow in 2011 is most definitively not Kiev in 2004.

If Putin is able to convince the Russian people, as well as himself, that these protests are the result of a western plot, the short term policy prescriptions will be a lot more clear.  The policy will consist of further limiting American and other western funds from supporting Russian NGOs, racheting up the anti-American rhetoric from state run media organs, playing the nationalist card even more strongly and similar tactics.  These policies, however, will likely have only a modest impact because they would be ignoring the more difficult reality that these protests are far more organic than Putin would like to believe.

For Russian citizens who are concerned about the way their own government works, and the contempt in which that government holds ordinary citizens, gratuitous anti-American gestures may not resonate as much as the Russian regime would like.  Putin is, therefore, in a difficult situation with no easy choices.  There is still a long way between this and any meaningful change to the regime, let alone democratization, but it is unlikely that the smoothly functioning, orderly semi-authoritarian regime which we saw in Russia during the last few years can be fully restored.

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It is possible that these demonstrations will lead to reform in Russia as the governing party realizes that continuing to steal elections will eventually lead to even bigger problems, but it is also possible that the government will conduct a harsh and possibly violent crackdown against the demonstrators.  Neither of these are outcomes would be good for the government.

Given all this, the Russian government may be asking why they bothered to hold the elections in the first place as the events have only caused them trouble.  Russia is not a democracy where elections are about the people having a chance to choose their own government or to weigh in on governance or policy issues by choosing between parties or individual with competing visions for Russia.  In Russia, and numerous other non-democratic countries that continue to hold elections, the purpose of elections is not for citizens to participate in democratic processes.  Rather, elections serve two principle functions.  First, they are an opportunity for the government to both reassert its power over the people by mobilizing them to affirm the existing leadership.  Second, elections provide the non-democratic regime with an opportunity to show powerful democratic countries that they are at least a little democratic.  There are other reasons, but these are the major ones.

Countries like Russia hold elections today because it is easier to fake being a democracy than to confront the criticism that comes from being an authoritarian regime that either has no elections at all or has elections where the winning party regularly gets 90% or more of the vote.  The problems which confront Russia now is that fewer countries believe that Russia’s managed elections are evidence that there is any democracy in Russia, so the leaders no longer get any credit for being democratic simply for holding elections where the fix is in months in advance.  At the same time, their ability to control the elections and to commit widespread fraud without provoking a response from the Russian people also appears to have dwindled.

This recent election demonstrated that it is no longer easy for Russia to have a phony election with some appearances of democracy.  This is good in many respects.  However, the election also showed the Russian leadership that it may no longer be worth it to even try.  Because elections and the environment in which they occur has been so poor for so long in Russia, elections are no longer seen by many outside observers as having much to do with democracy and democratic development in that country.  Accordingly, the Russian government is no longer able to strengthen its faux democratic credentials by holding bad elections.  Similarly, because of the diminishing popularity of the ruling party it has become necessary to commit greater and more obvious fraud.  Thus, elections are both risky and unproductive for the Russian government.

It is likely that if the Russian government, and other authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes, could do away with elections they would.  However, this move would come with a cost both domestically and internationally.  Citizens would be upset about losing what little influence they have over how the government is determined while powerful democratic governments would be upset about a clear move away from freedom and democracy.  It is not at all clear what these governments could or would do in response, but even if they did nothing it would not make Russia’s interaction with the democratic world easier.

Of course, if the Russian, or any other non-democratic regime, thinks it needs to abolish or reduce the significance of even undemocratic elections, it will.  This would be a serious and risky move to undermine what international norms exist regarding democracy and elections, but it could happen.  There is a clear, if depressing, logic to this type of decision particularly when considered by regimes that are almost solely focused on remaining in power.

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