And then there is the Netherlands, where the right-leaning coalition government under Prime Minister Mark Rutte is eager to put the country on a fiscal diet. Part of that diet will come at the expense of the Dutch armed forces – but not at the risk of severing Dutch involvement in the F-35 program.

Faced with having to trim EUR1 billion ($1.45 billion) from the budget by 2014, Dutch Defense Minister Hans Hillen announced a major military restructuring on April 8. As a result the armed forces will see their entire fleet of Leopard 2A6 tanks retired along with 17 Cougar utility helicopters, a DC-10 transport aircraft, 19 F-16 fighter jets and at least two patrol boats. Some 12,000 defense ministry posts will be axed and the general staff will shrink by 30 percent.

What will emerge from this process will be a smaller Dutch military no longer capable of tackling multiple oversees deployments whether under a U.N., European Union or NATO banner. Traditionally one of the strongest European contributors to foreign missions, the impact of these cuts will also leave the Netherlands with diminished NATO influence as some 100 Dutch posts within the Alliance command structure will vanish post-restructuring.

Yet as the budget scalpel does its work on defense the Dutch government has decided to push forward on the EUR100 million ($144 million) purchase of a second F-35 test aircraft. The purchase does not reflect a final decision regarding the replacement selection for the Royal Netherlands Air Force’ fleet of F-16s – that decision will not be made prior to 2014. Instead it indicates a desire by the Dutch to remain within the program as a means of retaining industrial workshare in the airplanes development and production.

The government’s decision to forge ahead with the purchase of a second test aircraft is indicative of the current defense environment among the advanced military nations in the West. As armed forces try to keep abreast of rapid technological advances the cost of weapons platforms escalates higher and higher squeezing already limited budgets and forcing defense ministries to mothball unique capabilities in favor of modern systems. The result is a smaller military with fewer planes, ships, tanks and personnel to crew them.

The counter argument to this is that advanced jet fighters such as the F-35 or Eurofighter Typhoon are more effective fighting tools and a capable substitute for losses in fighter numbers.

True or not, the cost of acquiring F-35s or other new-generation jet fighters brings pressure to bear on defense budgets that have been a favored source of savings in European capitals since the end of the Cold War. Such pricey choices can come at the expense of air-to-air refueling, search-and-rescue, surveillance, targeting and electronic warfare capabilities crucial to carrying out missions such as the one currently conducted by the NATO-led coalition in Libya. Thus while France, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and others commit combat aircraft it is largely left to the U.S. to carry out these other tasks in the Libyan theater.

With Europe confronting fiscal imbalances and growing debt obligations hard choices loom for many of its countries. Such choices are made more difficult for the 21 European nations who as dual EU-NATO members confront distinct requirements pulling their treasuries in diverging directions.

As members of the NATO Alliance these countries are tasked with committing 2 percent of annual GDP towards defense, while under EU Stability and Growth Pact guidelines each member must keep their budget deficit below 3 percent and their national debt below 60 percent of GDP. Juggling the two (albeit toothless) requirements has proven difficult for virtually every dual EU-NATO member in the best of times; coming off a banking crisis, an economic recession and government stimulus measures such a task is rendered that much more difficult.

A dual EU-NATO member itself the Netherlands is placed in a similar position. The cost of bailing out its banks following the global financial crisis set the state back over EUR20 billion ($28 billion). As a result the national debt jumped 33 percent in 2008 and now represents nearly 70 percent of GDP. Inheriting a budget deficit of 5.2 percent from the previous government the Rutte-led coalition intends to trim EUR18 billion ($26 billion) in expenditures and bring the budget deficit down below 3 percent by next year. Defense spending – only 1.4 percent of GDP in 2010 – will naturally be part of the equation.

The Dutch armed forces that emerge from this restructuring process will struggle to preserve their expeditionary capabilities at a time European nations are engaged in military operations in Afghanistan and Libya, anti-piracy operations off Somalia and peacekeeping mission in multiple locales. The Rutte government is placing a priority on fiscal responsibility and debt alleviation – not an altogether unwise choice. But by applying a paring knife to the armed forces it is limiting its foreign policy options in the future. The true cost will be felt the next time an ally asks the Netherlands to support military/stabilization operations abroad and is met with an abashed expression and a shaking of the head.

Yet in spite of this the Netherlands is opting to remain in the JSF program and will in all likelihood select the fighter as its preferred F-16 replacement. But because of the programs inflationary spike the initial rosy unit cost projections have long been left in the dust.

In the end the Dutch will have to settle for fewer aircraft than originally planned. The initial Royal Netherlands Air Force target figure was for 114 F-35s; this was dropped to 85 fighters by the fall of 2006. After having budgeted EUR6.2 billion ($8.7 billion) towards an 85-unit F-35 purchase revised estimates have shown a 22 percent jump in cost to EUR7.6 billion ($10.7 billion). Once a contract is finally inked the unit order will likely have shrunk further to between 50-60 aircraft.

In times of austerity tough choices have to be made and the Netherlands is choosing to sacrifice quantity for quality. Time will tell if the decision was the right one. But in an era of mushrooming security missions and irregular warfare numbers often outweigh firepower. After all, one splashy new F-35 cannot be deployed into two different theaters simultaneously.

Photo by Rennett Stowe.

The post The Netherlands Goes Long on the F-35 appeared first on The Faster Times.

The French relationship with the Arab Maghreb is steeped in colonial history and, for the Sarkozy government, embarrassments. One of the most notorious such blemishes relates to Tunisia, where French Foreign Minister Michele Alliot-Marie was tied up in a series of diplomatic faux-pas’ with the ousted regime of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine ben-Ali. These occurred at a time of low public support for Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) party and in particular for the president himself.

Then there is Libya, where France does not have the colonial baggage it carries in Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco. But as he did with the former leaderships in Egypt and Tunisia, Sarkozy appeared uncomfortably cozy with the Qaddafi regime, inviting the Libyan leader to Paris in December 2007 and even granting him permission to pitch his tent on the grounds of the French presidential residence, the Elysee.

So it came as a surprise to some of France’s allies that Paris boldly strode ahead of everyone else when the Libyan crisis erupted. With the opportunity to divest his presidency from the sense of tawdriness surrounding his past relationships with North African leaders and to alter the perception of slow-footedness created in the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, Sarkozy embarked on an aggressive – some might say impulsive – course with Libya.

First the French president broke with diplomatic practice and officially recognized the leadership of the Libyan rebels, the National Libyan Council, as the country’s legitimate government, thereby making France the first nation to do so. He then became the first to advocate for military strikes against Qaddafi’s forces and, once United Nations resolution 1973 was passed on March 17, was the first to send combat aircraft into action.

But his position that Libya’s rebels are the true representatives of the country has left France at odds with some of its allies and imposed complications on what would otherwise be a limited engagement. In essence, regime change in Libya is the ultimate objective and the fate of Sarkozy’s stance rests in the hands of rebel forces on the ground.

An interesting and somewhat overlooked aspect of the French intervention in Libya is Paris’ recent effort to regain its previous strong foothold in the Libyan arms market. Before a U.N. embargo was imposed on Libya in the early 1990s France had been a favorite supplier of Qaddafi. Through the 1970s and early 1980s Libya purchased an assortment of French material, including Dassault Mirage F1 fighter jets, La Combattante armed patrol boats, Super Frelon heavy transport and Alouette III light utility helicopters, as well as French missiles.

The lifting of the U.N. embargo offered France an opportunity to reestablish its defense supplying bona fides to Qaddafi’s regime under the presumption that modernizing an aging arsenal would be a Libyan priority. From France’s perspective locking down a position as a principal Libyan defense supplier would help to halt the erosion of the French share of the global defense market, which had tumbled from 13 percent in the late 1990s to 6 percent by 2009.

Although a limited market in comparison to the energy-rich Gulf Arab nations, Libya presented France with a ripe opportunity to clinch military hardware contracts and secure its first export contract for the Dassault Rafale combat aircraft. The inability to conclude a foreign deal for the new-generation Rafale had become something of an embarrassment when in 2007 the Moroccan government opted for the American F-16 in what had been expected to be a French export victory.

The failure of the Rafale on the export market was not the only concern. France’s renowned defense industry – nurtured by the government through generous state orders and aggressive foreign sales efforts tied to diplomatic outreach – is not immune to the sting of France’s fiscal pressures. With a growing public debt and budgetary pressures French defense equipment programs – the same ones used to feed domestic industry – will begin to feel a pinch. Therefore foreign orders are increasingly crucial as a revenue source for France’s defense manufacturing sector.

Aware of this impending reality Sarkozy carried on his predecessor’s push to rebuild the Franco-Libyan defense trade. But much like his relationships with the region’s leaders, this effort has occasionally been clouded in controversy.

A $400 million arms deal with Tripoli was reported in August 2007 on the heels of the release of Bulgarian medics who had been convicted in Libya of infecting children with HIV. That deal allegedly involved Milan anti-tank missiles and radio communications equipment. It also left the Sarkozy government scrambling to point out that there was no direct link between the arms agreement and the freeing of the Bulgarian medics.

Although Qaddafi reportedly had the Rafale aircraft, Tiger attack helicopter and other high-end ware on his long-term shopping list, French arms sales to Libya between 2005 and 2009 ultimately amounted to less than $300 million (EUR210.15 million, or $295 million). No new sales for a major French military platform – such as frigates, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters or combat aircraft – were ever reached.

Thus the question might be asked as to whether events would have played out similarly if such an expansive defense sales agreement with Qaddafi had been secured. For instance, if Libya had bought expensive items such as the Rafale or the FREMM multipurpose frigate would Sarkozy have been as eager to push all his chips to the center of the table regarding direct military intervention?

Certainly France’s ultimate position on the actions of the Qaddafi regime would be unlikely to differ. And Libyan resistance against allied intervention would be nary as effective as it has already proven to be. Deliveries of the Rafale, for example, would have taken years to complete and even if fully equipped prior to the current intervention Libyan pilots and crews would be novices in comparison to their French and NATO peers. Furthermore, French forces would be well aware beforehand of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the Rafale and would know how best to combat their own aircraft.

But would Paris have been as eager to lead a coalition against one of their leading customers?

In the end the answer is probably “yes” since for Sarkozy the domestic side of the equation seems to have outweighed all else. French support for military action is – at this early stage – strong, and Sarkozy can play upon the national idea of France as a crucial actor on the global stage in the hopes it benefits his sagging poll numbers.

If the rebels ultimately emerge victorious then Sarkozy’s actions will have proven to be shrewd. And if a new government ultimately buys the Rafale or any other expensive French military hardware than his efforts will not only have been deft, they will truly have been a coup.

Photo by Jerry Gunner.

The post What if France had Concluded a Major Defense Sale with Qaddafi? appeared first on The Faster Times.

At stake was an opportunity to provide the U.S. Air Force with a fleet of new aerial tankers that will replace its Eisenhower-era KC-135 refueling planes.

The tanker acquisition program initially began in 2001. The first attempt – a plan to lease Boeing 767s rather than purchase them outright – fell apart when it became embroiled in ethics violations resulting in a former senior Air Force acquisition official and a chief financial officer at Boeing both being prosecuted and sent to jail.

After that failed endeavor Congress intervened, mandating that a formal competition be conducted. This was announced in January 2007 with the lease-to-buy arrangement waived in favor of regular purchasing of the aircraft. The effort ultimately dragged into a two-round slugfest with the second round – dubbed KC-X by the Air Force – seen by the Pentagon as a chance to finally bring conclusion to the entire messy affair.

The competition pitted two companies – U.S. aerospace and defense giant Boeing and European Airbus parent EADS (European Aeronautic Defense and Space) – in a struggle to win one of the more lucrative military aviation contracts on the international market.

For Boeing the competition represented an opportunity to research and develop innovative new methods in refueling technology, provide it with an edge in similar global competitions, and keep its premier rival out of its home market. As for EADS, at stake was an opportunity to not only notch a profitable contract, but – more importantly – to solidify a foothold in the U.S. market by establishing a local fixed-wing manufacturing base.

As the Air Force’ announcement date approached EADS had reason to feel confident. Proposing a solution based on the larger Airbus A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) airframe, EADS had already managed to come out ahead of Boeing in the initial round of competition for the opportunity to supply the Air Force with up to 179 refueling tankers. That round, decided in February 2008, had resulted in a successful Boeing challenge upheld by the Government Accountability Office, which found “significant errors” in the competitive process.

EADS had made its previous bid in tandem with U.S. firm Northrop Grumman but this time went forth alone after Northrop dropped out in March 2010 citing rules favoring the Boeing bid.

Confidence in EADS’ proposed KC-45 bid stemmed from several crucial factors, including the larger A330 airframe that could fly farther, hold more cargo and carry more fuel than Boeing’s KC-46A proposal based on the smaller 767 airframe. Such characteristics were of importance to Air Force officials convinced that future military operations will center on the Pacific Rim region where long refueling flights would be the norm.

Another issue seeming to favor EADS’ KC-45 option was that Boeing’s KC-46A “NewGen Tanker” solution will not take to the air until 2015. Considering the Air Force’ need to begin retiring its aging KC-135s purchased in the 1950s and 1960s and integrate a new fleet into its inventory, the KC-45 might have been considered a more timely alternative. Further, EADS seemed to have navigated the U.S. political minefield with savvy, winning powerful supporters in the southern states along the Gulf.

Yet Boeing was not without its own advantages. Despite EADS bidding through its U.S. holding company, EADS North America, and its political allies, Boeing was still seen by many as the “home team”. Though its 767 airframe was smaller than the A330 the Boeing solution offered more operational flexibility as the larger EADS plane would face basing limitations requiring additional money spent on modifying airfield infrastructure. Also, the fuel consumption estimates for the A330 over a 40-year period projected higher than those of the Boeing plane, thus increasing the operational costs of the EADS option.

Because the two aircraft alternatives offered up were very different aircraft, the Air Force was confronted with the dilemma of producing requirements that somehow fit both platforms while performing a competition seen as open and fair. In the end there could be little doubt that the loser would feel the competition was weighted in favor of the winner.

Ultimately the Boeing bid proved more cost effective for the Air Force, thus the choice of the KC-46A as the preferred solution. Pentagon officials described Boeing’s proposal as the “clear winner”, stating that it offered better value to the U.S. taxpayer – perhaps itself an indicator that the Air Force is adjusting to the national budget reality and preparing for leaner times ahead.

When EADS announced it would not protest the Air Force decision a week later it emphasized the cost factor, claiming the outcome was decided by price. According to information provided to EADS during its Air Force debriefing the Boeing bid came in $2 billion – or 10 percent – under that of its own.

One more thing should be noted. Against the tanker competition was the backdrop of the Airbus-Boeing commercial rivalry, one stoked by Boeing’s accusation that Airbus has been the beneficiary of illegal subsidies from the European Union. The spat landed in the World Trade Organization’s in-box, with both sides claiming victory at the WTO’s ruling on the subsidy dispute. While the WTO case had no bearing on the tanker competition it underlined the ferocity of the rivalry between the two bidders.

The question now becomes whether Boeing can execute its end of the deal by keeping its KC-46A program within budget while meeting the agreed-upon delivery schedule of 18 aircraft by 2017. Should it fail to do so the competition for the next production batch of tankers – KC-Y – may result in a victory dance for Boeing’s arch rival. But that competition is more than a decade out and for now Boeing is securely perched in the catbird seat.

Photo by Monica’s Dad.

The post The Ugly Air Force Tanker War Comes to Conclusion appeared first on The Faster Times.

In one of the tiniest, lowest-profile nations in the Middle East the latter scenario is generating uncustomary attention. A government crackdown on a protester encampment in the capital city of the Gulf kingdom of Bahrain on February 17 left five people dead, many more injured and emotions rubbed raw.

Ruled by the Al Khalifa family since the late 18th Century, Bahrain faces sectarian pressures that threaten to fracture the tiny island nation beyond recall. The kingdom’s lopsided sectarian makeup has served as a persistent worry for the Al Khalifa family, who fear that the Shiite Muslim majority represents a dangerous element thirsting to unseat its Sunni rulers. To the Sunni ruling class the Shiite community – 70 percent of Bahrain’s population – represents a dangerous fifth column in their midst, one that can be utilized for ill-intent by Bahrain’s principal strategic threat, Iran.

The result of such fear and anti-Shiite prejudice has meant this segment of the population has been relegated to a second-class existence and in the process provided very limited avenues to government ownership. Government access for Shiite political voices is afforded in the lower house of parliament, the Council of Representatives, but these elected slots are subsequently neutered by the Al Khalifa-appointed members of the upper house of parliament, the Shura Council.

It is also hardly lost on Bahraini Shiites that through government policy Sunni foreign nationals – mainly from India and Pakistan – are absorbed into the military and police force and eventually granted citizenship in an attempt to dilute the overwhelming Shiite-to-Sunni demographic.

It is no surprise, therefore, that tensions have spilled over – much like they promised to do last fall when weeks of Shiite rioting resulted in the arrests of scores of Shiite political opposition leaders in advance of the October parliamentary election.

As in the case of Egypt, the situation places the United States in a delicate political position. On the one hand as a promoter of democracy it must lend ear to the grievances of the Shiite community and press the Bahraini rulers for reforms; on the other it has to stand firm with one of its closest, most reliable allies in the region. The former is the American ideal; the latter is realpolitik in crude form.

With Bahrain and the rest of the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms bent on stopping civic unrest at its inception expect realpolitik to win out in Washington.

The reason for this is practical and simple: Bahrain plays a central role in U.S. military operations in the Middle East and its security relationship with Washington is a close one. The kingdom serves as headquarters for the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet it has allowed U.S. forces to utilize its Shaykh Isa Air Base for combat missions in both Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Bahrain also served as a forward operating point for U.S. forces during the First Gulf War in 1991. Its Air Force pilots flew sorties over Iraq during the conflict and Bahrain is one of only two Gulf Arab states to deploy forces in Afghanistan, sending 100 police officers to serve for two years there as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping mission.

Bahraini support for U.S. regional policy has resulted in its designation by Washington as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) as well as a supportive U.S. hand in military assistance. Though its armed forces are small in manpower at around 10,000-strong, Bahrain’s military is well-equipped with American material ranging from F-16 jet fighters to UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters to M60A3 tanks, M113A2 armored vehicles, an ex-U.S. Navy Perry-class frigate, Javelin anti-tank missiles, self-propelled howitzers, multiple launch rocket systems and a ballistic missile defense radar system. Since 2000 the U.S. has sold Bahrain some $1.4 billion worth of military hardware.

The upshot of this support for Washington is that Bahrain remains firmly in its camp – something that can hardly be underestimated at a time U.S. forces remain militarily engaged in two foreign theaters and a troika of regional actors – China, Iran and Russia – seek to expand their influence beyond their own backyards, possibly testing U.S. resolve in the process.

Small as it is Bahrain remains a crucial link in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) chain of strategic deterrence the U.S. is relying upon to help keep Iran at heel in the region. Bahrain’s fears of Iran, conflated though they may be, assure that its security compass remains fixed in a U.S.-centric direction. The Bahraini rulers intent to meet their internal and external security threats head-on is reflected in the steady growth of its year-on-year defense spending: 5 percent in 2010, 15 percent this year and plans for another jump of 8 percent in 2012.

Yet Washington is left walking a tightrope. Bahrain has made mild gestures in the past regarding reforms, but there is little doubt that the monarchy still holds firmly to its power and King Hamad’s writ is absolute. If it fully supports the monarchy the U.S. risks irrevocably losing the Bahraini population. Pressing for real constitutional reforms and the alleviation of Shiite grievances while coupling such demands with a reassurance towards some softer (or ideally ceremonial) form of monarchical rule might be Washington’s best path forward. But even this comes with no guarantee of a favorable outcome.

Ultimately the Gulf monarchies are not going to easily let go of control over their kingdoms – and the U.S. is not going to alienate itself from those nations allied to its interests.

Photo by Official U.S. Navy Imagery.

The post Don’t Expect a Split in the U.S.-Bahrain Relationship appeared first on The Faster Times.

Regardless of which way the protest winds blow, all eyes will be on the Egyptian military. After all it was the military that toppled the monarchy in 1952 and the military that has supplied the country with all four of its presidents since that time. Though not as involved in everyday political affairs as it was during the 15-year reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-70), the Egyptian military has always been a crucial actor and the firewall ensuring the stability of the Mubarak regime.

It was therefore hardly a surprise that Mubarak, himself a former air force commander, chose to appoint former army general Omar Suleiman to be his vice president and another former air force commander, Ahmed Shafik, to be prime minister. These moves merely underlined the hold the military has on the Egyptian political order – a hold it is wary of relinquishing considering the power it might lose under a new government. Such power is not merely restricted to political patronage, but also comes in the form of generous retirement benefits and economic privileges such as military-run businesses.

With so much to lose the Egyptian military holds a crucial role in how the current drama plays out.

What worries government officials in the U.S. and Israel is the vacuum that opens up once Mubarak is gone. It has been the Egyptian military that has largely dictated the direction of the nation’s foreign policy over the past 60 years. Should military leadership suffer convulsions from within – say in the form of a split between the older, established officers and the younger rank-and-file – does the armed forces outlook change in ways that cause Washington and Jerusalem discomfort? Or does a new government try to clip the wings of the armed forces in order to exert tight control over them?

A point of reference to the latter can be seen in Turkey, where the mildly Islamist AKP (Justice and Development Party) government has gradually peeled away the armed forces’ power under the notion of promoting a healthy democracy capable of gaining admittance into the European Union.

That reference, however, is a positive one in comparison to an alternative such as Iran. There the Ayatollah Khomeini set up a parallel military force – the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) – to serve as the Praetorian Guard of his Islamic regime. The IRGC has been designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. Congress. Testimony by members of the Defense Intelligence Agency to the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2010 claimed that the special Qods Force arm of the IRGC provides training, arms and financial support to terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah as well as Iraqi Shia militants.

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Control over the Egyptian military is no small matter considering it represents the largest standing military force in the Arab world. It is also a force cultivated by the U.S.

Since 1979, following the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the U.S. has been Egypt’s primary supplier of weaponry. The scope of the Egyptian armed forces’ American-derived equipment runs from main battle tanks (M1A1 Abrams) to jet fighters (F-16) to attack helicopters (AH-64D Apache) and on into advanced, precision-guided missiles such as the air-to-air Sidewinder and air-to-surface Hellfire. This hardware comes at the expense of the American taxpayer, who via the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) arrangement provides Egypt with $1.3 billion annually, thus making the Egyptian military the second-largest recipient of such funding after Israel.

Washington’s contention is that such funding is crucial to maintaining a close military relationship with Egypt, promoting interoperability between forces should future joint operations be required, ensuring U.S. military access to the Suez Canal and over-flight routes needed to support American forces operating in the region, and as a reward to Egypt for continuing to uphold its peace agreement with Israel. Another unspoken factor is the benefit to the U.S. defense industry that comes from taxpayer-subsidized Egyptian orders of American military hardware.

In addition, the Pentagon also provides Egypt with grants under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program that sponsors the training of Egyptian military students in the U.S. Some 4,200+ Egyptian students have been trained under IMET and the U.S. military considers the program invaluable to creating closer ties between the two sides.

The presumption therefore is that U.S. FMF, IMET and other economic aid (together totaling around $1.5 billion per annum) essentially “buy” Washington considerable influence in Egypt.

But what happens if Washington is wrong and a new government opts to separate itself from the current pro-U.S. orientation of the Mubarak government?

One negative scenario is that Egypt comes under control of a leadership disinclined to continue granting the U.S. military unfettered access to the Suez Canal or maintain the peace with Israel.

Many observers are invoking the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah, noting that at the time Tehran was a leading recipient of U.S. military aid. Those weapons ultimately fell into the hands of elements decidedly unfriendly to U.S. interests. At the time of its revolution Iran had acquired through the 1970s some $17 billion worth of armaments with another $12.2 billion on order.

As for Egypt, between 2002 and 2009 the U.S. has delivered it $10.5 billion worth of arms. While careful to ensure that this weaponry is not equal in sophistication to that provided Israel, it nonetheless provides the Egyptian military with a sharp-toothed edge. It also presents Washington with the dilemma that such weaponry could eventually be turned against the Egyptian people or one of the closest U.S. allies.

Ultimately the U.S. is left hoping the Egyptian military will peacefully maintain order, help prop up an interim government, and ultimately preside over a smooth transition of power from one regime friendly to U.S. interests to another – more democratic – government similarly aligned.

Israel no doubt prefers the status quo, which has provided it with over 30 years of peace on its border with Egypt, plus the security leeway to concentrate its forces on its northern borders with Lebanon and Syria and alongside Gaza. The Israelis are also hardly likely to forget that Palestinian democratic elections in 2006 resulted in its nemesis, Hamas, emerging victorious. They understand Egyptian elections resulting in triumph for the Muslim Brotherhood may ultimately spell the end to their peaceful relationship with Cairo and that after returning the Sinai peninsula to Egypt in 1982 they have no land-for-peace alternative to offer up to a new Egyptian leadership. For now all they can do is wait and see and continue remaining silent for fear of damaging an outcome favorable to their interests.

Should the Egyptian military ultimately end up playing king-maker in any succession plan to the Mubarak regime, than the U.S. perception of its influence within the Egyptian armed forces will be tested.

Whether what Washington wants and the Egyptian people want, however, is another matter.

The post How Much Influence Does $1.3 Billion Buy the U.S. With Egypt’s Military? appeared first on The Faster Times.

The intensified U.S. effort to reverse a Taliban resurgence in parts of Afghanistan – launched by the Obama administration in 2009 – has been met with a spike in American casualties, which jumped from 155 in 2008 to 317 in 2009 and 499 in 2010. As the Afghan operation increasingly hemorrhages American blood, the hit to U.S. taxpayers runs in parallel, escalating from $20 billion in 2005 to $104.9 billion in 2010. For fiscal year (FY) 2011 the Pentagon has requested $110.3 billion to go towards its Afghanistan operation – more than double its final appropriation request for the Iraq operation set to expire at year’s end and $14.1 billion higher than it was granted in FY10.

The ongoing cost in blood and treasure has had a wearying effect on the American public. Timelines continue to shift, the inability to secure the critical Afghan—Pakistan border remains an unhealed wound on the body of the war effort, and success in Afghanistan seems to hold limited strategic value relative to national security interests elsewhere.

Thus the question naturally arises: How exactly is Washington supposed to extricate itself smoothly from the Afghan theater?

The answer: By recruiting, equipping, training, and eventually molding the ANSF into an effective force capable of taking over full security responsibility throughout the country.

In Vietnam this policy was known as “Vietnamization”. In Iraq the rebuilding of a post-Saddam Hussein security force has resulted in the recruitment and training of some 410,000 police and 245,000 military personnel, allowing the U.S. to proceed with its planned year-end withdrawal from that country.

The American approach is founded on the tenet that indigenous forces can better earn the long-lasting trust and goodwill of the local population than American troops, resulting in the accumulation of on-the-ground human intelligence necessary to defeat insurgents in “wars amongst the people”. As these forces grow in size and capability, U.S. forces cede responsibility to them, eventually clearing the path to a smooth exit from the operating theater.

For now the effort to cobble together an effective Afghan National Army (ANA) and police force remains fraught with difficulties. For starters there are ongoing issues within the ANSF regarding corruption, drug use, ethnic discrimination, morale, desertion, Taliban infiltration and shoddy equipment. NATO forces training Afghan soldiers and police have to remain wary of incidents such as those involving renegade individuals who turned their weapons on British troops in 2009 and July 2010.

Still, the U.S. and its NATO allies remain undeterred in their effort to build a competent Afghan security force. Although there are disagreements amongst the allies about how large such a force must be, a decision of the standing security committee (combining officials from the Afghan government, the United Nations and NATO members) to expand the ANSF beyond the previous benchmark goal of 305,000 personnel by October 2011 to that of 378,000 by October 2012 is likely to move forward. Currently the combined total of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police is 266,000.

It was barely over a year ago that levels of desertion from the Afghan National Army eclipsed the number of recruits. Now salaries for personnel are higher, ranging from $160 to $240 a month. The training of Afghan troops has been expanded to include basic reading and writing skills, seen both as an enticement for recruits as well as a means by which to gradually eliminate corruption within ANSF ranks. The training regimen has been improved as the number of trainers has increased, jumping from the 1:79 instructor-to-student ratio in November 2009 to a 1:29 ratio in August 2010.

Of even greater importance to the buildup of the ANSF has been the accelerated effort to improve the outfitting of its personnel with more and better material. NATO-standard weaponry such as M16 rifles, M4 carbines, M9 pistols, M2 heavy machine guns, the M24 sniper weapon system, 81- and 82-mm mortars are issued to Afghan Army personnel, along with high frequency and very-high frequency (VHF) radios, body armor and night vision gear.

For heavy equipment the U.S. has handed over refurbished M113 tracked armored personnel carriers, logistical and engineering equipment (tractors, bulldozers, cranes, etc), up-armored Humvees and specialty equipment including mine-rollers and mine-detecting robots.

The U.S.-NATO goal for the fledgling Afghan Army is for it to field a counter-insurgency (COIN)-capable Air Force by 2016. This ideally will include VIP transport, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, troop transport and fixed- and rotary-wing close air support capabilities drawn from 146 total aircraft. Currently the Afghan Air Force has only 50 aircraft, including old An-32 airlifters, newer C-27 transporters, Mi-35 attack helicopters, and – controversially to members of the U.S. Congress – Mi-17 transport helicopters. The Russian Mi-17 was designed in Soviet times specifically for the hot-and-high environment of Afghanistan. The Pentagon has placed $648 million in orders to buy and refurbish over 30 Mi-17s, much to the chagrin of U.S. lawmakers who argue that the sole pursuit of the Mi-17 by the Pentagon has suffered from a lack of oversight and allowed Russian contractors to charge exorbitant unit costs.

Despite signs of progress over the past year the broad U.S. and allied goal of building up the ANSF continues to face substantial hurdles.

The contributions of NATO members to the training mission are still subject to criticism, as the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan remains around 700 trainers short. Yet providing trainers was supposed to be the “out” for governments reluctant to supply combat troops towards the U.S.-led surge effort.

In the meantime the U.S. continues to plough more and more money into the development of the ANSF, but so far the process has largely emphasized quantity over quality. With quantity comes the cost of maintaining a large force, including meeting payroll, buying fuel, the purchasing and upkeep of equipment, constructing necessary infrastructure, and annual operational and training costs. A shaky government overseeing a poor economy provides little hope that such a price tag can be met by Kabul in the future.

Instead these costs will likely fall on the back of U.S. taxpayers for years to come. The Obama administration is expected to request around $12.8 billion within its FY12 budget for the ongoing buildup of the ANSF. Already Washington spent $9.2 billion on the ANSF in 2010 and will invest a further $11.6 billion during 2011. With the inclusion of this year’s earmarks, Washington has invested more towards the Afghan Security Forces Fund ($36.6 billion) than it has into the Iraqi Security Forces Fund ($12.5 billion) since the 2007 “surge” in Iraq. Though the disparity in investment is explained by the revenue stream available to the Iraqi government from its energy reserves, it should be noted that the Afghan government was able to spend a mere $450 million in total on security in 2010.

The annual multi-billion investments made by the U.S. towards the Afghan National Security Forces over the past five years illustrate the high cost of building a security force essentially from scratch – one with no guarantee of future effectiveness and one which Kabul will struggle to fund in years to come. For Washington that seems to be an acceptable price tag for exiting Afghanistan.

Photo Copyright of Wildkat Photography.

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Yet NATO ambles on, ever aware of its members’ attitudinal divergence regarding its utility. The schismatic views held of the Alliance by it 28 members stem from distinct foreign policy outlooks.

The Western European elder statesmen – including France, Germany, Belgium and Italy – feel that NATO’s principle function should be to focus on maintaining security in Europe’s backyard.

These members believe that lower-intensity missions – such as overseeing security reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo – are best tackled by a European security element operating under an EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). While they still view NATO as the principle security guarantor of Europe, they believe pan-European defense provides the EU with foreign policy latitude enabling it to operate independently of the United States. As such, they champion the development of a unique European defense arm – a concept that has in the past drawn frowns from both the U.S. and the United Kingdom.

Then there are the newer Alliance members, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who during the Cold War-era lived under Soviet domination. Following the dissolution of local communist control, these former Warsaw Pact countries saw entry into NATO as the crucial insurance policy against potential Russian aggression. For the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Poland, etc, Article 5 of the NATO Charter – stating that an attack on one member is an attack on all – is considered sacrosanct.

Finally there are the trans-Atlanticists. Led by the U.S., these countries (including Canada, Denmark, the U.K.) believe NATO needs to be a pro-active body capable of operating beyond the European sphere. For these members the war in Afghanistan has served as a proving ground for Alliance resolve, one that has often come up short on results.

Ultimately the two major divergence points amongst these three groups involve the future direction of the Alliance and its relationship with Russia.

The post-9/11 activist footing of the Alliance seems to quietly be fading as the mission in Afghanistan drags on and war-weariness pervades public sentiment on the home front. Many European members of NATO chipped in with troops for the Afghan mission in a show of Alliance unity – or to be more frank, as a means of showing solidarity with the U.S. The threat perception from radical jihadists emanating from Central Asia is deemed quite low in Europe. As for the matter of terrorism, the European view is that it is best countered through policing at home and rigorous intelligence-gathering abroad. Sending troops to a remote, distant country to battle the Taliban, the sentiment goes, accomplishes little while instead consuming money and soldiers lives.

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For the U.S., the leading proponent of an activist Alliance, dragging NATO beyond its security perimeters has exposed the operational capabilities divide amongst members. Not only does the U.S. invest roughly 70-75 percent of all the collective money spent on defense, but in terms of investment per individual soldier the divide is also profound. This disparity encourages the belief that American “hard power” capabilities underwrite Alliance security, leaving European members free to focus on its “soft power” preferences, such as foreign development aid, etc.

Such perceptions may not entirely be fair, but they exist nonetheless. A growing U.S. interest in the Pacific Rim and Indian Ocean arenas leaves many European nations wondering if the continent should not focus more on a Defense Europe that remains more concept than reality. But for a region struggling annually to meet the NATO minimum investment standard – 2 percent of GDP allocated towards defense matters – European defense partnership is better handled through weapons standardization and synchronized procurement practices enabling its countries to maximize what little they do invest.

A Europe spending more wisely and more capable of tackling security questions in its own backyard would free up the U.S. to shift resources to other theaters of increasing importance. But it also leaves open the question as to what the Alliance exists for if not for mutual security and burden-sharing. If a Defense Europe pillar can equally handle security for Europe, than why, some may rightly ask, does there remain a need for NATO?

One answer comes back to the former Warsaw Pact countries whose distrust of Russia runs deep. Their fears of Russia’s intentions for its “near abroad” were only reinforced by Moscow’s military incursion into Georgia during August 2008. But these countries’ uneasy relationships with Moscow often run counter to those cultivated by their peers in Western Europe.

For France, Germany, Italy and others, building a healthy relationship with Moscow is a priority – particularly considering that Russian energy shipments provide the EU with 40 percent of its gas and over a third of its oil. Petro-politics therefore serves as a wedge to European solidarity. While the Eastern and Central European NATO members continue to emphasize closeness with the U.S. as a hedge against Moscow, the other European NATO members do not view Russia as a conventional threat. Yet the latter countries are also in the midst of their own defense budget cutbacks and as a result are equally uneager to see the U.S. cast its gaze elsewhere, leaving NATO adrift.

Thus NATO continues to be held together by the mutual dependency between Europe – fearful that the U.S. will turn its back on the continent – and a U.S. in need of allies as it faces the rise of new rivals and strategic threats elsewhere in the world. The trans-Atlantic Alliance, locked in a state of perpetual autumn, ultimately exists because its members believe it needs to exist. Despite their different views on what the Alliance should or should not be, no members are trying to leave.

Meanwhile there are others who would desperately like to join NATO. Just ask Georgia.

The post Why NATO Survives appeared first on The Faster Times.

In this volatile arena burgeoning populations are outstripping supply, in the process creating a looming freshwater crisis. Such a crisis may herald the very resource wars prophesied by environmental scholars, think tanks and government agencies. In such a fragile region the upheaval caused by water disputes in one area could threaten to spill across borders, dragging multiple nations into conflict.

With water a necessary and finite resource, industrialized nations such as Israel are pressed to improve their water-use technology while insuring hydrological capabilities and supply are not infringed upon by rivals. In other words, water security – both in terms of infrastructure and sources – is an imperative for the tiny state as its consumption rises due to improved living standards and a growing population.

Meanwhile the conflicting pressure caused by declining supply and increasing demand in the Arab world is aggravated by poor management and inefficient usage at the national level. Countries such as Jordan and Syria are running out of clean water, while Egypt has become more and more protective of its supply of Nile River waters.

Wars over water resources are not altogether a new concept in the Middle East. The Six-Day War of 1967 was in part an Israeli response to a Syrian attempt to dam the Yarmuk River, which feeds the Jordan River – itself a crucial water source for Israel. Altogether some 30 military clashes over water have occurred since the Israeli state was founded. These have alternately involved Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese attempts to divert waters flowing from the Banyas, Dan, Hasbani and Yarmuk rivers into Israel. Feuds between Jewish settlers and Palestinians over a well in the West Bank city of Nablus back in March resulted in the shooting death of a Palestinian by Israeli forces.

While the Levant makes up the obvious flash-point for an outbreak of water-related conflict, to the south it is Yemen that represents the greatest resource-deprived danger in the region. The country is already home to myriad civil pressures involving secessionist violence in the south, an active insurgency along its northern border with Saudi Arabia and an embedded Al Qaeda presence offering itself up as an alternative to the regime of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

But aggravating the situation are the country’s demographic and resource realities. Economically, Yemen remains heavily dependent upon its declining oil production sector. While the country’s oil and gas reserves dwindle its population grows at an explosive rate: from 7 million in 1975, to 23 million in 2010 – with that figure expected to double by 2035. Mixed in with population pressures, economic problems and civil strife is Yemen’s declining freshwater supply which currently provides Yemenis with less than two percent per person of the global average. Cultivation of the mild narcotic, Qat, has only worsened the situation by forcing farmers to drill deeper into underground aquifers rapidly running dry.

The Houthi insurgency to the north has already dragged Saudi Arabia into Yemen’s internal conflicts and the prospect of a greater breakdown might persuade other regional and outside actors to involve themselves in Yemeni affairs.

Other areas of the region may also see water-related tensions escalate in coming years. Turkey’s control of the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers places Syria and Iraq at the mercy of Ankara to keep the water flowing. The power thus placed in Turkish hands may serve to undermine relations between a fledgling central Iraqi government and an increasingly confident Turkey determined to play a more active role in the Middle East.

Should the Iranian nuclear issue deteriorate to the point a U.S. and/or Israeli preemptive strike occurs, the infrastructure of the Gulf Arab states – not just in terms of oil, but water – might be impacted. Tehran has threatened to retaliate against any first U.S./Israeli strike by launching missile attacks against the Gulf Arab nations allied with Washington. Such aerial assaults might target oil terminals, ports, urban centers and desalinization plants that provide countries like the UAE with the bulk of its drinking and clean water supply.

Little wonder that the UAE has focused a significant portion of its defense investment over the past several years on building a modern, diverse missile- and air-defense network. This includes the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defense system, the Russian-built Pantsir-S1E surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft weapon system, and, most likely, the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system which comes with a base price tag of a cool $1.9 billion.

When the threat to the region from resource pressures is juxtaposed with the ongoing arms spree seen in many of its countries what emerges is a tinderbox. Defense expenditures for the Middle East rose by nearly 31 percent between 2006 and 2010. This upward trend in defense spending is unlikely to stop any time soon – much like the increased demand for water amidst an expanding regional population.

Of course such population and water supply pressures are not unique to the Middle East. Indeed, in 1900 the world population was 1.5 billion; today it is roughly 6.8 billion. Yet while the world’s population has grown its water supply has remained static since the dawn of humankind. Water scarcity, therefore, is a very real threat facing the world and one in which the Middle East might merely serve as the first area of conflict in a broader global resource clash.

Photo by Tracy Hunter.

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To the Marine Corps the EFV program is an integral component of its central mission as the nation’s amphibious, combined-arms expeditionary force. A combination floating transport, armored personnel carrier and assault vehicle, the 38-ton EFV represents a power-projection capability that the Marines insist they cannot do without. Ideally this swimming infantry vehicle would provide the Marines with a ship-to-shore component allowing them to conduct forcible entry operations from an over-the-horizon, ship-borne departure point.

But like so many other large defense projects, the EFV has been plagued by delays, cost overruns and emerging threats unforeseen at the time of the programs inception. Because Secretary Gates and others view the EFV as an unnecessary, diamond-encrusted niche platform meant for past operations having no bearing on today’s battlefield, the program is considered very vulnerable to the budgetary axe.

Whether in current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq or in future scenarios against potential foes such as Iran or China, under what circumstance, Gates and his staffers wonder, would the Marines conduct a forcible-entry amphibious operation requiring the EFV?

Against a sophisticated enemy, opposing harbors and beachheads would be mined, gunfire from concrete bunkers would rain down on Marines disembarking from the vehicles, and anti-ship missiles would force the amphibious assault to begin from as far away as 25 miles from shore. The latter is an important point in that Marines would be compartmentalized inside the EFV for roughly an hour during which the vehicle would be skipping over choppy water.

If, on the other hand, a vacated point of entry was found to land Marines ashore then there would be no need for a Swiss Army knife of a platform like the EFV when another, cheaper landing craft option would do.

Perhaps more worrisome for the Marines is that Gates’ concerns are echoed by the Senate Appropriations Committee, which in September chose to underwrite only one more round of tests on the vehicle. It also authorized $184 million towards termination costs for the contractors in the event the EFV does not measure up to snuff during its latest testing phase.

The last such round of tests in 2006 exposed problems with the EFVs reliability and performance. Currently the vehicle suffers a system failure every 16.4 hours; the requirement is for the time between failures to average 43.5 hours, thus indicating the distance the program needs to make up to meet the Marines’ stated objective. Because of this current shortcoming the EFV remains in the systems design and development (SDD) phase almost eight years after many of the vehicles kinks were supposed to have been ironed out.

Worse, the EFVs costs have spun upwards resulting in a more expensive program that will produce fewer units for the Marines. The original plan called for the purchase of 1,025 EFVs at the cost of $8.5 billion. The Marines now plan on a buy of 573 vehicles at roughly $24 million apiece, bringing the total cost of the program to up over $11 billion. Little wonder that the independent Sustainable Defense Task Force produced a report for Congress back in June arguing that they should cancel the EFV in order to save taxpayers an estimated $8-9 billion from 2011-20.

Other program critics point out that the EFV was not designed to withstand against the now-ubiquitous threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), although adding the necessary v-shaped hull to withstand such blasts would likely weigh down the vehicle more and defeat the purpose of having rapid ship-to-shore, sea-skimming capability.

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For the Marines the entire debate over the EFV is representative of their current identity crisis. Rather than concentrating on the amphibious role that earned the service a place in American military lore, since 2003 the Marines have in effect been made to serve as a smaller version of the U.S. Army, conducting land operations in Iraq and now in the volatile Helmand province in Afghanistan.

The fear within the Marines is that the further away they get from their amphibious roots, the principle raison d’etre of the Corps becomes submerged within the Army. Because of this the Marines remain wedded to the concept of amphibious forced-entry capability, despite the fact that the last such high-intensity landing occurred 60 years ago at Inchon during the Korean War. In essence, the Marines have made the EFV – or the concept of the EFV – an either-or dilemma, a false dichotomy whereby its higher brass insists they get an upgrade to their ancient amphibious assault vehicles, the AAV7A1 (originally designed in the 1960s) or the Marine Corps as it is known becomes a distant memory.

There is the point that for the U.S. military to remain a full-spectrum force it must retain capabilities that seem outdated to the modern strategist. The purpose of the Marines’ ship-to-shore basis is emphasized by past and present Marine commanders who note that since the Inchon invasion the Corps has conducted 106 amphibious operations, most recently in the case of the relief mission to Haiti.

There is also the point to be made that this small, elite service has watched as other branches have been beneficiaries of the Pentagon equipment pipeline in recent years. The Air Force has gotten its F-22 jet fighters (albeit in much smaller numbers than anticipated), the Army has received Stryker armored combat vehicles and the Navy has its Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Meanwhile, the Marines have continuously upgraded their AAVs while waiting for their own specialized, new-generation alternative.

The hope for the Marines now is that the 6-7 EFVs undergoing development testing show marked improvement from the last round, thereby making cancellation a difficult proposition for Gates. The fact that an FY11 defense budget has not yet been passed buys the program more time and allows the Marine brass the opportunity to make their case to newly-elected House members who might be inclined towards placing the Pentagon on a fiscal diet.

But the Marines, who are a component of the U.S. Navy, are also vulnerable to a naval department whose own budgetary pressures may make it keen to shed itself of “wasteful programs” that become public relations nightmares during periods of austerity sentiment. If so, the Marines may be better off looking at less expensive alternatives to the EFV concept rather than turning the program into an Alamo of their choosing.

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As the BRICs have grown in economic strength each has sought to modernize their armed forces in order to protect their interests and expand their influence. Most significant of these efforts are the ambitious military buildups undertaken by China and India. These two nations highlight what is often seen as a slow, but inexorable, West-to-East hemispheric transfer of power. As the “Asian Century” unfolds both eye each other warily, recognizing in the other a potential check on their own regional security aspirations.

China and India – whose economies represent the second-largest and fourth-largest in the world – have officially spent $78.6 billion and $32 billion, respectively, on defense this year. Chinese year-on-year defense spending has risen 7.5 percent in 2010; New Delhi in turn has boosted its defense allocation by almost 4 percent. Considering the degree of economic growth both expect to have achieved by year’s end this increase in defense expenditure can be considered negligible relative to GDP expansion.

However, during the 20-year period prior to this year Chinese defense expenditures annually jumped by double-digits, including 15 percent in 2009. The general consensus is that China’s defense budget as officially divulged is a low-ball figure and that actual military-related spending may exceed $150 million. China’s sustained focus on improving and increasing its military capabilities coupled with what is perceived as growing People’s Liberation Army (PLA) influence upon the country’s foreign policy has prompted unease amongst its neighbors. In response some are boosting their own defense budgets and moving closer to an American embrace.

China’s military expansion is predicated upon safeguarding the country’s access to energy and mineral markets, achieving power-projection capabilities and cementing its status as the preeminent power along the Asian Pacific Rim. For China to attain the latter it must be able to deny the U.S. Navy unmitigated access to the Western Pacific. Accomplishing this would provide China with the added benefit of diminishing U.S. regional influence as Washington’s allies there would be left unsure of its military reliability in times of distress.

With this in mind the PLA’s procurement focus has been on weaponry that can neutralize American air-sea power such as the Dong-Feng anti-ship missile, stealth submarines, air-defense missile systems, reconnaissance satellites and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a variety of payloads and striking with increased accuracy.

India has a variety of security concerns, stretching from internal terrorist attacks to a potential two-front war with China and Pakistan. Worries over a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean have prompted a massive $12 billion naval build-up that calls for India to achieve a 160-ship navy by 2022 that will include three aircraft carriers, 60 surface combatants and the absorption of 400 new aircraft into the fleet.

Overall India is expected to spend $50 billion across the next 20 years on a military modernization effort whose centerpiece is a 126-unit medium multi-role combat aircraft competition estimated at up to $11 billion. To pay for all of its new equipment New Delhi plans to increase its defense budget in proportion to the country’s economic growth. Currently India’s defense earmark represents 2.5 percent of its national GDP.

Though both countries are undergoing parallel military expansions there are two distinct divergences at play as each pushes to modernize their arsenal.

The first involves defense industrial capabilities. Despite efforts by India to achieve a benchmark goal of 70 percent self-sufficiency in defense material production by 2005, the country’s defense industrial base – hampered by dysfunctional procurement practices – is only capable of meeting around 30 percent of the armed forces’ equipment needs. China, on the other hand, has a large military-industrial complex. This sector continues to advance primarily through license-production agreements with Russia that result in reverse-engineered Chinese derivatives, and the absorption of technologies garnered through commercial partnerships that are subsequently integrated onto military platforms.

Secondly, despite its home-grown industrial shortcomings, India has access to the world’s principal defense suppliers – a market from which China is largely excluded. Thus India can pit European, U.S. and Russian producers against each other in order to acquire modern platforms that provide it with a qualitative military-technological edge over China.

Ultimately the question surrounding the military advances of China and India militarily is how they affect the greater global defense balance.

Despite its flat-lining defense budgetary trend and recent economic hiccups, the U.S. remains the world’s preeminent military power. However, its ability to extend its reach unmolested to all corners of the globe will gradually be diluted in the Asian Pacific Rim by the rise of China.

Conscious of the need to rely on allies to strengthen its regional position and allow for greater flexibility of action elsewhere, Washington continues to cultivate closer ties with New Delhi as a means to check Chinese ambitions. Yet despite growing defense cooperation with the U.S., India will refrain from any relationship it perceives as placing it in position of secondary partner. Therefore Washington cannot expect a U.K.-like “Special Relationship” with New Delhi.

In the Western Hemisphere, American power remains the long-term reality. Latin America’s recent military expenditure spike – led by Brazil – does not necessarily constitute an arms race (Colombia and Venezuela excepted), but rather a modernization push aimed at phasing out aging inventories in favor of newer ones. Europe remains bound to the U.S. by the NATO Alliance, and the global financial crisis – followed by European sovereign debt scares – has resulted in defense cutbacks and placed European military power on a downward trajectory.

As the global balance of power continues shifting from West to East and Asia becomes the central theater for great-power jostling, one country takes on increasing importance: Russia.

Of the four BRICs, Russia is the most demographically – and perhaps economically – vulnerable. Its once-proud defense industry, despite retaining certain strengths, is marked by decay. The limitations of its conscription-based military were revealed during its brief 2008 war with Georgia; the latest reform effort launched by Moscow marks an attempt to break the Russian Army from this Soviet-era model. With competing interests in Central Asia and a vulnerable southeastern border alongside China, Moscow is uneasy over Beijing’s growing regional influence.

Much like the India-U.S. relationship, if deftly managed a Russia-U.S. partnership in Asia would be of strategic convenience to both parties. It would allow for Russia to feel a greater sense of security to its east and provide the U.S. with a crucial link in its fence of strategic partners encircling China. Unless Washington artfully navigates these and other relations in Asia its position as the lone superpower will recede sooner than expected. In its place may be a new global order full of opportunities for missteps and miscalculations that the U.S. will no longer be capable of policing or preventing.

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