Stormy Seas Ahead for the U.S. Navy

Ever since President Theodore Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” circumnavigated the globe in 1909 the United States has had a worldwide military presence built upon its blue-water navy. Today the U.S. Navy is the undisputed master of the seas, capable of projecting power anywhere across the globe. Its presence from the Mediterranean Sea to the Pacific Ocean ensures maritime trade routes remain open to international commerce and government initiatives from disaster relief to combat operations are properly supported.

But a combination of factors clouds the Navy’s future outlook. More to the point, its future is ambiguous because of the country’s fiscal health and a naval shipbuilding strategy predicated upon expensive high-end warships that substitute’s quantity for quality.

The budgetary pressures facing Washington means more circumscribed defense funding through the near future. One byproduct of flattening defense budgets is that the Navy’s 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) goal of achieving a 313-ship fleet seems in jeopardy before it even begins.

The 30-year naval shipbuilding plan calls for the construction of 276 new ships. Among these are six aircraft carriers, 12 ballistic missile submarines, 44 attack submarines, 50 surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers), 66 littoral combat ships (LCSs), 20 amphibious ships, 19 resupply ships and 59 support ships. Under this plan the foundation of U.S. naval power projection will remain largely based upon the carrier strike group (consisting of an aircraft carrier and assorted escort ships).

First brought to Congress’ attention in February 2006, the affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan has come into question on Capital Hill. This is partly due to a belated realization by some lawmakers that after years of spending largesse the U.S. is left staring at a massive debt load. As deficit reduction starts to drive the political agenda in Washington, future defense spending plans will naturally fall under the microscope of Congressional budget committees.

The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan is based upon an average funding allotment of $15.9 billion per year in constant 2010 dollars. However the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the naval plan would instead require 19 percent more in annual funding – an average of $19 billion per year for new construction, or $21 billion per year for total shipbuilding costs. If the CBO estimate is proven correct, this mismatch in projections will inevitably lead to fewer ships.

Several issues contribute to the emerging gap between the Navy’s projections and what it will ultimately receive.

First is the aforementioned fiscal environment. As Washington’s financial ledger hemorrhages red ink the cost of servicing U.S. debt rises ever upward, thus crowding out areas of discretionary spending. Encumbered by widening budget deficits, unsustainable debt and benefits promised to an aging demographic, going forward the U.S. government will have but little choice than to seek budgetary savings. The end result is that defense expenditures – already being squeezed from within by competing pressures related to maintaining the all-volunteer force and reequipping the military – will inevitably be sliced. When defense earmarks shrink the tendency is for service branches to be pitted against the other in a fight to protect their own rearmament interests. Expensive warships – much like expensive jet fighter programs – become vulnerable to the budget scalpel.

Second, the overwhelming mismatch between American naval capabilities and those of any other country renders the Navy vulnerable to Pentagon demands to eliminate wasteful programs and seek more affordable solutions. Though the current size of the Navy is in the 280-ship range – its smallest figure since 1916 – Defense Secretary Robert Gates has called into question critics who maintain naval cuts will result in capability gaps. Acknowledging that the U.S. Navy will need to maintain trans-oceanic power projection capabilities, Gates remains nonplussed by the argument that the focus on the irregular wars is chipping away at the Navy’s ability to counter China’s expanding maritime claims.

Finally there is the impact of the Navy’s plan on the U.S. maritime industrial base. Naval shipbuilders generally require a steady drumbeat of orders so as to retain technical workplace skills, control costs and ensure financial viability. Fewer orders means fewer functioning shipyards, resulting in limited competition and higher costs per ship. The consequence of this diseconomy of scale is a diminished naval order book. From the 1980s through the recent decade the Navy’s price-tag per ship has gone from $1.2 billion to $2.7 billion. During that same stretch annual ship orders plummeted from 17 to 6, thus reducing the Navy from its 594-ship figure in 1988 to 283 in 2009. With questions surrounding the cost of a new submarine to replace the Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines the Navy has to be mindful that other programs are not crowded out of the procurement pipeline. Not only must its acquisition requirements be balanced, but the Navy must improve its manning, readiness and training or the service lives of its existing ships will deteriorate, thus further shrinking the fleet.

The pressures facing the U.S. Navy are many, but they are no different than those confronting the other service branches, much less other militaries worldwide. However, they come at a time the Navy is being asked to take on more responsibilities. From intelligence-gathering to halting the flow of dangerous material on the high seas to ensuring Iran is incapable of blocking oil shipments through the strategic Strait of Hormuz, a smaller navy makes fulfilling its growing list of tasks more onerous.

Placing the guns versus butter debate aside, the question comes down to whether the Navy can find the proper balance between its needs and desires. Fewer add-on requirements once the production process has been initiated would help eliminate cost-overruns and allow for greater spending efficiency. More small, multipurpose ships might also be a way of beefing up naval numbers and squeezing more from shrinking procurement allocations.

Whatever the solution, American naval power is necessary to U.S. commercial and security interests. Just as U.S. air supremacy has ensured that American troops on the ground have not suffered a casualty at the hands of enemy aircraft since 1951, so too has U.S. dominance of the seas meant that the Navy has not had to undertake a forcible amphibious entry since 1950. Sometimes that which becomes easily taken for granted represents the best return on an investment.

Photo by An Honorable German.