Irregular Warfare and the American Civil War Experience

Last fall as the White House debated whether or not to adopt counter-insurgency (COIN) or counter-terror plans for Afghanistan, certain voices outside the Beltway called instead for a draw-down. Some of the arguments raised against escalating or prolonging the war were based on humanitarian concerns. Others focused on the cost-versus-benefit strategic rationale.

The latter argument, in distilled form, can be summed up this way: As Afghan operations involve American forces in an irregular war in a distant, impoverished country bordered by actors who see that nation’s fate as a pawn in a bigger regional game, the situation is nigh insoluble except at inordinate cost and for minimal gain.

Lurking in the American collective subconscious is the discomfiting and uneven memory of the Vietnam War. There U.S. forces fighting North Vietnamese Army regulars were often frustrated by Viet Cong guerrillas blending in amongst the native populace. The long and bloody campaign in Southeast Asia – shown nightly on television – sapped public patience with the war. After an American withdrawal in 1973 the North Vietnamese communists were able to triumph, toppling the South Vietnamese government in April 1975.

The cursory lesson for many Americans of the Vietnam generation was that irregular wars are extremely difficult – if not impossible – for the U.S. military to combat. Thus the U.S. should not involve itself in any theater of war where targets are not clear, and overwhelming American firepower, superior technology and training cannot be unleashed to achieve a clearly-defined victory.

The problem confronting the U.S. Army in the post-Cold War era – particularly after the rapid American military success in the First Gulf War in 1991 – is the difficulty it has encountered versus current foes in shaping the battle-space to its liking. Recognizing the distinct inequality between U.S. conventional capabilities and their own, opponents shrewdly adopt non-linear tactics in order to balance out the military equation.

When viewing the broader geo-strategic expanse there are scant operational scenarios in the near-term whereupon the U.S. Army will meet a foe who does not fully, or at least partially, adopt guerrilla tactics. Lest the assumption that the U.S. cannot win these types of irregular campaigns become an article of faith, it should be recognized that throughout its history the U.S. military has conducted irregular operations with varying degrees of success.

The Union Army conducted one such overlooked campaign in the Upper South theater during the American Civil War. Most Americans think of the Civil War as a series of clashes between large armies at places such as Antietam and Gettysburg, failing to realize a significant portion of the conflict entailed irregular warfare. These campaigns also involved clashes between non-military pro-Union and secessionist irregulars. Intense animosity between these opposing sides often resulted in episodes of brutality no less striking than those transpiring in the sectarian chaos of post-invasion Iraq.

Irregular warfare in the American Civil War has been overlooked largely because earlier historians viewed it as separate from the conflicts larger, more conventional campaigns. Although secondary in importance to the Union after its principal cause of defeating the larger armies of the Confederacy, irregular warfare was a vital complement to the overall Confederate strategy. Uniformed partisans and irregular guerrillas helped the Confederacy by tying up and harassing Federal forces, disrupting their lines of supply and communications, and exerting Confederate influence throughout the “border states” of Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee.

But the Union Army was gradually able to counter the irregular warfare efforts of the Confederacy through adaptation, innovation and flexibility. Despite lacking an existing doctrine on counter-insurgency such as today’s U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 the Union forces eventually proved capable of adjusting to on-the-ground realities.

Federal forces were also helped in their efforts by two important factors: Civilians in secessionist states with Union sympathies, and the actions of the Confederate government. The former provided intelligence, local knowledge of the terrain and a ready body of militia. The most crucial example of the latter was the decision by Confederate leaders to implement the Conscription Act of 1862. This mandated that all white males aged 18 through 35 must serve in Confederate forces for the duration of the war (later broadened under two succeeding acts to include all men ages 17 through 50). The Confederate Conscription Act proved deeply unpopular for many Southerners who saw it as an abuse of state authority and an intrusion on their civil liberties.

As the war unfolded Union forces relied upon blockhouses, guarded bridges and control of the rivers to secure their own lines of communication and supply. The Union cavalry, the Federal Army’s mobile shock troops, were charged with striking at Confederate partisans.

In Arkansas a Union counter-insurgency and pacification strategy was implemented that helped bring Confederate activity largely – though not completely – to heal. This involved the use of gunboats and landing forces for riverine purposes, followed by a provost marshal system that sought to re-establish the writ of the Federal government. Also of crucial importance was the utilization of highly effective “Home Guard” units of Arkansas Unionists as a counter to guerrilla raiders. A key innovation was a repopulation strategy meant to protect pro-Union civilians whereby whole families were moved to fortified farming villages defended by armed Union loyalists.

By 1865 when Federal forces had secured the surrender of the two largest standing Confederate armies, the Union Army had shown itself capable of effectively finding counters to secessionist irregular warfare.

Yet despite such episodes of past success, there are clearly seismic differences between the irregular warfare witnessed by the U.S. Army’s forebears in the Civil War and today’s protracted war in Afghanistan. The most obvious of these is that American forces are not fighting on their native soil. Instead the U.S. military effort today runs up against the logistical nightmare of Afghanistan, where supply lines are long and fragile. Whereas during the Civil War the Union soldier shared a common language, history and largely a common culture with southern citizens, no such sociological bridge exists between the American soldier and Afghan civilian.

Finally, and of particular importance, Confederate irregular warfare was not conducted under the classic 20^th Century Maoist model of “People’s War”, which seeks to topple state authority through popular support and guerrilla warfare tactics. For the southern rebel soldier, the Confederacy was the state. They fought to protect the norms of the antebellum South and against what they perceived as invasion from by the North.

In the end whether the U.S. adopts counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism tactics (or a hybrid mixture) in Afghanistan is but the smaller question. The larger question pertains to the overall strategy and how such tactics are used to shape the end-state Washington hopes to achieve. Ultimately it will be through a political solution that the U.S. extricates itself from Afghanistan. As the British Army in Northern Ireland and the Israel Defense Forces in the West Bank and Gaza can attest, the days of clear victory achieved through defeating an opponents large standing forces have at present faded into the rear-view.

Photo by The U.S. Army.