Just How Powerful is the Iranian Military?

While Iran’s nuclear program remains the subject of intense media speculation, the nonlinear actions of the Islamic regime continue to occupy Western and Israeli intelligence officials not yet completely swept up by the gathering atomic storm. Such scrutinized Iranian activities include its development of long-range ballistic missiles, expansion of the Iranian naval presence beyond the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz out into the Gulf of Oman, the provision of military, financial and training support to militant groups, pursuit of advanced air-defense capabilities and Tehran’s strengthening of economic and security ties with countries largely marginalized by the international community.

Whether through the thinly-veiled threat of conventional capabilities or the use of soft power and asymmetric means, Iran’s ambition is to attain a dominant position in the Middle East. Although regional hegemony remains an elusive goal due to the presence of American forces, the military strength of Israel, and the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy from West to East, Iran nonetheless represents a powerful local actor whose specter looms throughout the region.

Iran’s military arm is divided into three main components: the regular army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Order Forces (or Law Enforcement Force). While the regular army is charged with national defense and the Order Forces oversee border security and the national police, the IRGC is the Praetorian Guard of the Islamic Revolution, outfitted with its own army, air force, navy and Special Forces units, as well as an internal intelligence branch. The IRGC controls Iranian missile production, the nation’s chemical and biological weapons, and is believed to oversee the nuclear developmental program.

The politically-powerful IRGC not only serves as the Islamic regimes right arm, but as purveyor of its external interests. Through the use of the Guards’ special Qods Force the Iranian regime is able to nurture its proxies in the Levant, which include Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These elements are important to Iran as an indirect means through which to strike at Israel -- in the process ensuring Israeli military attention is fixated foremost on immediate threats emanating from Gaza and southern Lebanon. The Qods Force is charged with providing arms, training and financial support for these groups, while in the process gathering intelligence on Israeli military tactics and capabilities.

The Qods Force has also been active in Iraq, where its Ramazan Corps has aided Iraqi Shiite militants and been linked by the U.S. military to the flow of Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) into Iraq and the proliferation there of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Spreading its reach further abroad, the Qods Force is now believed to have placed operatives in Venezuela, adroitly posting them in embassies and cultural/charitable institutions.

Such actions are worrisome not only for the U.S. and Israel, but for the Arab states in the Middle East -- many of whom view the Islamic regime unfavorably. These countries, including the Gulf Arab nations and Egypt, fret over an Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis they fear will gain stature in Iraq as the U.S. troop presence there winds down. They note the manpower and artillery advantages Iran holds over their own armies and grow apprehensive over Iranian threats to shut down shipping through the Strait of Hormuz choke-point, thereby disrupting some 40 percent of the world’s seaborne oil trade in the process. And of course there remains the elephant in the room, the ongoing Iranian nuclear enrichment program.

Such concerns are certainly not lost on Washington, which has continued to assist the buildup of a Gulf defense deterrent. The U.S., along with Israel, has also noted Iran’s sustained effort to improve its air-defense capabilities, including the purchases from Russia of 29 TOR-M1 (referred to by NATO as the SA-15 Gauntlet) short-range air-defense systems and the long-range S-300PMU Favorit surface-to-air missile system. Though the latter item was contracted for, the Russians have held up delivery due to the strenuous objections of the Israelis and the U.S., both of whom naturally desire weak Iranian air defenses should the least attractive option to stop Iran’s nuclear program -- a preemptive air strike -- ultimately be given the go-ahead.

As for the military threat to the Arab states by Iran, this is both real and inflated. On paper the Iranian armed forces, with IRGC elements included, are indeed formidable. The combined Iranian ground forces total 350,000 personnel, while air and naval elements are filled out with 57,000 and 38,000 troops, respectively. There is also the paramilitary appendage of the IRGC, the 400,000-strong Basij Resistance Forces: a volunteer militia that gained international notoriety for its ferocity during the regimes post-election crackdown last summer. Basij devotion to the regime was exemplified during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war when its members willingly sacrificed themselves sweeping Iraqi minefields with their bodies.

But Iran’s impressive manpower strength belies underlying military weaknesses, including outdated and atrophying equipment, substandard technologies and a lack of both airborne early-warning and air- and naval-power-projection capabilities. While Iran has plenty of combat aircraft, many are aging American platforms (F-4 Phantoms, F-5Es and F-14s) dating back to the pre-Revolution era of the Shah. Against this array of jet fighters the Gulf nations hold a numerical advantage of nearly two-to-one -- plus they have the added benefit of flying advanced platforms such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, F-18 Hornet and F-16E/F Block 60. The Gulf Arab states also spend roughly $60 billion on defense versus around $9 billion for Iran, with Saudi Arabia alone allocating $41 billion for military/security purposes in 2009.

Though militarily capable enough to match its Arab neighbors, an Iranian first-strike against these countries is at best a remote possibility, particularly with U.S. forces stationed in the region. There are also economic concerns that render direct aggression unlikely, including the $12 billion in trade conducted between the UAE and Iran. And despite its provocative statements about blocking the Strait of Hormuz, such an action -- if Iran could indeed pull it off -- would itself damage the Iranian economy by choking off the channel through which most of its own oil exports pass.

Instead Iranian conventional military strength is publicly amplified for intimidation purposes through martial displays and military exercises, while serpentine measures are used to expand Iran’s regional influence. This bifurcated strategy has ably served Iran, allowing it to extend its reach beyond its immediate borders while intimidating its Gulf neighbors.

Its ballistic missile capabilities notwithstanding, in truth the Iranian military is better suited to play defense than to launch an offensive against its neighbors. On its own turf the IRGC presents a formidable foe whose use of asymmetrical warfare would prove damaging to any invader. But outside its own boundaries Iran seems content to stick to its game plan, which is to bleed its adversaries through use of proxies and to promote itself as the implacable foe of Western interference in the Muslim world.