Will the Indian Ocean Become the Next Arena of Great Power Conflict?

As the global balance of power continues to shift from west to east, so too do the intermingling pressures that brought about the savage conflicts of the last century. Economic expansion, shipping lanes, geography, territorial disputes and natural resources all intermingle to form a potentially toxic environment. Avoiding the missteps that led to such catastrophes as occurred in 20^th Century Europe has become something of a tightrope walk for the region’s two preeminent powers, China and India.

Nestled together along the Himalayas and Kunlun mountain ranges, these economically ascendant and burgeoning military powers warily eye each others moves, hoping to prevent the other from gaining some insurmountable strategic advantage. Ambitious rivals whose five-month border war in 1962 resulted in a Chinese military victory, a disputed Indian claim to a slice of territory known as Aksai Chin, a heavily militarized border (referred to as the “Line of Actual Control”) and a traumatized psyche in India where China is concerned.

Ever mindful of Chinese moves, India has watched with growing anxiety as Beijing has invested in a highway linking it to Pakistan, India’s fiercest regional rival. This land route signals an attempt by Beijing to circumvent a crucial Chinese vulnerability, one that India might exploit in the even of another outbreak of hostilities between the two nations: China’s need for secure shipping lanes which ensure its vital energy supplies from the Middle East are not disrupted.

With both countries proceeding to expand their military capabilities and both heavily dependent upon Middle East oil to fuel their economic growth, maneuvering for the upper hand in the Indian Ocean has intensified. The shipping lane which stretches from the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea and across the Indian Ocean represents the crucial transport lifeline for 80 percent of Chinese oil and 65 percent of India’s. Disadvantaged by fate of geography, Chinese energy trans-shipment must not only wind its way along this route, but then must traverse the heavily-pirated maritime choke-point, the Straits of Malacca, before then proceeding northward through the South China Sea and into home ports.

The length and delicacy of such a journey makes protection of this vital shipping lifeline a fundamental security priority for China. That India, hoping to project its power throughout the Indian Ocean region, has embarked on a naval buildup only adds to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) sense of urgency regarding sovereignty over its sea lines of communication.

As a result, China has launched an effort to protect its commercial interests by undertaking a series of port development and construction projects in Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Myanmar (Kyaukphyu), Pakistan (Gwadar) and Yemen (Mukkala). The Chinese government has assiduously cultivated warm relations with Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts and providing them with large amounts of aid in a bid to build up its political capital in the region.

The PLAN, meanwhile, has constructed a hardened deep-water base at Sanya, on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The base is capable of accommodating both attack and nuclear ballistic submarines, enabling these vessels to perform patrols in the northern Indian Ocean. There is also the possibility that the PLAN may begin stationing Su-30MKK fighter/attack aircraft at bases in Myanmar, providing China with an extended airborne strike range over the Bay of Bengal.

China’s expansionary efforts in the Indian Ocean region have been dubbed by the Pentagon as the “string of pearls” strategy. But while the creation and development of logistical support bases represent a necessary component of this strategy, military muscle is what underwrites its execution. With an expansionary defense budget expected to reach close to $80 billion in 2010, China is the world’s second-largest military investor and has allocated more and more to naval capabilities in the past decade. Like India, the PLAN has undertaken its own blue-water naval development. This involves the continued expansion of its submarine, destroyer and oil tanker fleets, and possibly the construction of one or more aircraft carriers.

India, which for the time being arguably has a naval edge on China, is pushing forward on a ten-year, $15 billion naval acquisition plan. India’s plan to grow its blue-water capabilities includes bringing three aircraft carriers into naval service by 2015.

Among some of the crucial naval platforms in Indian development are six Scorpene submarines produced under license with French technologies (plus a follow-on order for six additional submarines), six improved Project 17A (improved Shivalik-class) frigates, a nuclear-powered missile submarine (the INS Arihant), and the domestically-built Project 15 (Delhi-class) destroyers. India has also introduced Russian MiG-29K jet fighters into its aircraft fleet, intending to deploy them on the carrier INS Vikramadity – formerly the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov – when it finally is introduced into Indian naval service.

India is also taking steps to expand its air force bases in the Andaman and Nicobar island chains and plans to station Su-30MKI fighters, mid-air refuelling tankers and short- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on these island bases.

This dual naval build-up has become worrisome for those with vested interests in the greater Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy had long been entrusted with protecting shipping through the region. But with China’s rise as an economic power and status as budding rival to the U.S., Beijing is unlikely to view the American 5^th Fleet as some metaphorical benevolent hand helping to protect its sea lines of communication. Indeed, American efforts to court India as a foil against China’s expanding regional influence have only added to Chinese distrust regarding Washington’s intentions.

Then there is Japan, which like China relies heavily upon energy transshipment through the Indian Ocean. With a heightened PLAN presence across the same shipping lane Japan uses to ferry Middle East oil to its ports, Tokyo might opt to bolster its own naval component, thus upping the naval traffic in the region and increasing the possibility for friction.

The potential for a military showdown is always strong when the interests and concerns of powerful nations intersect. But so too is the potential for partnership and pragmatism. Trade between China and India has grown exponentially since 2002; in 2008, China became India’s largest trading partner. This increased trade volume helps to weave the two countries’ economic interdependence. If the 21^st Century is to become the Asian Century that some predict, then China and India must carefully balance their needs and strategies against the security concerns of the other. Avoiding hazardous missteps in the Indian Ocean would be as good a place to start as any.