The defense trade between Russia and India has long been a fruitful one for both parties. Stretching back to Soviet times, Russia has found a fertile market for its defense products in India and today has an estimated $9-10 billion worth of military-related contracts with New Delhi in its order book. But since the end of the Cold War, India has been courted by an increasing number of eager defense suppliers, including France, Israel and the U.S. While Russia provides for 70 percent of India’s military equipment, it is no doubt aware of New Delhi’s attempts to diversify their sources for defense hardware and lessen its reliance on one producer.
Making matters more delicate for Russia is that its defense industry faces difficulties pertaining to shrinking state investment which is reducing the ability of the Russian defense sector to match its Western counterparts in terms of innovation and technologies. Despite record-high exports in 2008 of $8.5 billion and pronouncements of Kremlin support, Russia’s defense base remains anxious for capital in the face of eroding Chinese orders and the lingering negative reputation of Russian through-life support for its military products. In short, Russia needs to retain a strong foothold in the Indian defense market in order to maintain the solvency of much of its military industrial sector.
Threatening to undermine Russia’s vital trading relationship with India is the ongoing project to refurbish and convert the Soviet-produced heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, the Admiral Gorshkov, into a standard aircraft carrier that will be outfitted with sixteen ‘navalized’ versions of the MiG-29 (labelled the MiG-29K) and eight naval helicopters. The ship has been rechristened the INS Vikramaditya for Indian service.
The episode involving the Admiral Gorshkov has evolved from a convenient swap for both parties – Russia picked up needed defense work and export revenue, while India would receive a low-cost carrier solution for the replacement of its five-decade-old, ex-British Royal Navy carrier, the 28,000-ton INS Viraat – into a something bordering on a debacle.
When India agreed to purchase the ship from Russia in 2004 the price tag was $1.62 billion (including the aircraft) and post-conversion delivery was set for 2008. Since then the delivery date has been pushed back to 2012 at the earliest, and the cost to New Delhi for the final product has escalated to roughly $3 billion. While the increasing price tag has raised the pulse of India’s national auditor, which claims the cost to New Delhi for the Admiral Gorshkov is greater than if it had purchased a new-build carrier, the new delivery date is extremely problematic as it comes one year after the INS Viraat was scheduled to be retired.
Though India has not reached agreement with Russia on the latest cost requirement, it has yet to nix the project and conversion work on the ship continues. Unable to deal with the embarrassment of cancelling the program after paying hundreds of millions to the Sevmash shipyard in advance, India – which negotiated with Russia for almost ten years in an attempt to drive down the asking price for the vessel – will likely see the deal through.
Designed as a combination aircraft carrier and missile-launching cruiser, the Admiral Gorshkov, originally called the Baku prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, was laid down at Nikolayev South shipyard, Ukraine, in 1978 and commissioned as the fourth Soviet Kiev-class ship in 1987. The Kiev-class ships were designed to operate Yakolev Yak-38 vertical take-off and short-landing (VSTOL) aircraft, as well as Ka-27 maritime helicopters. The Yak-38 turned out to be a disappointment; unable to fly in hot and high conditions, slow in speed and capable of only a limited combat range. Given the nickname the ‘widowmaker’ due to its unreliability, the fleet of Yak-38 aircraft were removed from service in 1991, effectively rendering the Kiev-class ships useless.
Into the picture stepped India. With well-established ties to the Russian defense industry, a naval establishment thirsting for an expanded maritime presence on both seaboards and the Indian Ocean, and Moscow seeking to shed redundant defense platforms, the deal to purchase the Admiral Gorshkov seemed a natural fit for New Delhi.
But on closer inspection there were underlying problems with the ship, some of which the Indian defense establishment must have recognized. The Gorshkov made only one long-distance cruise during its short service life, that coming in 1987 – the very year of its commissioning. The ship suffered a boiler room explosion in 1994, and that, along with its high maintenance costs, resulted in the Gorshkov’s retirement from service in 1996. Finally, its water purification system – necessary for the functioning of the steam turbine propulsion engines – was a disaster, requiring renovation and/or replacement of the steam propulsion system. This, along with the extension of the ships flight deck and the installation of a ski-jump ramp on its bow, has led to the escalation in the price for the Gorshkov’s refit.
Still, Indian pique at the ramped-up cost for the ship is understandable in light of mismanagement performed at the Sevmash shipyard, which undertook the refit of the Admiral Gorshkov without physical blueprints of the ship. The shipyard’s director general was fired in 2007 and placed under criminal investigation on suspicion of corruption – reportedly related to the Gorshkov affair. Yet despite the reports of sloppy work and inept handling by Sevmash of the project, Russia remains intent that India cover the escalating costs, warning New Delhi that it would be quite willing to simply hand the refurbished ship back to the Russian Navy. While the Russian Navy remains in need of an aircraft carrier, this threat is likely a bluff intended to keep India on board with the project.
Ultimately the deal for the Admiral Gorshkov has reached the tipping point. India needs a conventional take-off carrier and Russia, facing U.S. inroads into its largest defense market, needs to keep New Delhi happy – particularly if it hopes to emerge victorious in the competition for the ultimate prize, the $12 billion Indian jet fighter competition. Both sides saw a convenient match when first signing the contract for the retrofit and transfer of the ship, in the process overlooking both the Admiral Gorshkov’s inherent problems and the shortcomings of the Russian naval sector regarding aircraft carrier construction. Despite this, the ongoing struggle for completion of the Admiral Gorshkov rolls on, leaving open the question of whether delivery of the ship into Indian service will leave both parties satisfied, or merely relieved.

















Tanesh Gagnani says:
Russia is proving to be a unreliable partner (time and again). I would say this is the perfect time for US to make inroads in the Indian defence market (also hurt Russia where it hurts them the most).
Offer India USS KITTY HAWK (which was retired in Jan 09) at a discounted price (just the refurbishment cost). If this is done US will also practically force India into purchasing F-18 and increase the number from 126 to 200(which is India's original intent from the very beginning.
H. H. Gaffney says:
Any idiot could have seen that the Gorshkov conversion project was going to be a disaster. To put it simply, Russian steam plants (boilers) don't work. See the Sovremenny destroyers: I have four good stories about them belching black smoker, and just about all have been retired prematurely (lucky China, to have four!). The Kuznetsov has been retubed at least seven times during its 18 years in commission. Supposedly the Kuznetsov got the Kiev's condensers, which failed miserably during the Kuznetsov's cruise to the Med in 1996; it had to be trailed by a water tanker. Of course SevMash didn't have plans: the Nikolayev shipyard in Ukraine had lost them. And SevMash quickly discovered they would have to rewire the whole ship -- with completely new plans for that. The silliest words in this article are "need(s)." Why do Russia or India "need" carriers? As one Chinese official has said, for the "symbolism." When we visited Russian Pacific Fleet HQ in 1998, many of the staff there had served on the Kiev-class Minsk, and expressed great regret at its having been retired. They liked being on a big ship -- even though nobody could ever figure out what the Kiev class was good for, except as large targets. However, in my visits to several Russian navy HQs, the only pictures on the walls were either of Peter The Great-era sailing ships or the Kiev class. When you have no good military rationale for some capabilities, it's amazing what follies you can get into.
Rakesh Jayaram says:
Anyone who suggests Russian weapons don't work is blind/bigot/biased. And BTW, some people can't stand India-Russia cooperation at all. It's not about symbolism alone. Like the SSN Nerpa that India is acquiring from Russia, the Gorshkov is a tech demonstrator. The Nerpa n-submarine will acquaint Indian seamen with a difficult to master technology until India's own home built n-subs are launched. The Gorshkov is a quantum leap from India's smaller range aircraft carriers that carry just 20 or fewer aircraft. The country has already laid the keel for a much larger class of carrier. Several will be built in keeping with India's great power status in the coming years. Similarly, more n-subs will roll out of the docks too. The Russian problems with aircraft carriers have to do with their whole approach to the idea of floating airfields. Initially, they were more interested in helicopter carriers that would travel the high seas hunting for US n-subs or raid coastal cities. However, that proved to be totally wasteful as other n-subs could perform the first task better and cruise missiles the other. So the Yaks were developed but it was a sidelined military project that never quite took off like other primary weapons like the T-72 tanks, MiG interceptors or Sukhoi fighter bombers. The Russian Navy, despite the superhuman efforts of Admiral Gorshkov, never really became a force like the US sixth and seventh fleets. Being mostly landlocked was one major reason for the lack of proper development. However, the Russian n-subs like the Delta and Akula are still driving terrible fear in American hearts. When two appeared off the east coast of the US, there was general alarm in the US media and the Pentagon. In fact, the US navy couldn't even find one of them. Dismissing Russian weapons is easy from the comfort of your living room. Facing them in battle (as the Indians showed the Pakistanis numerous times) is a different matter altogether.
John_udt says:
The Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier was an Old Soviet Rusting Ship that Russia offered to India when no other country was ready or had to give for India in a Short time.The Ukraine shipyard did not want to give the blue prints to Russia or India on any of their secrets in building the aircraft carrier. So the blue prints got lost!
So then when the actual work started both India & Russian shipyard team had to replace about 70% of the old steel & equipments/weapon.
So now the ship had got more than 70% new parts including the boilers .So that means there was additional work in removing the old 70% parts from the ship that was not included in the original cost / plan. New cables have to be laid as the 70% upgrade happened. Old electronics had to be replaced with the new electronics. The fluctuation in the market has also some influence in the cost hike.
The New rebuilt Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier looks good now. Most of all for the money we spent on the Old aircraft carrier worth as the learning experiences that both Russia & the India Technical team got during this project. This gave confidence to the Indian team & India has started to build a new aircraft carrier now & more to be built in future.
I believe that the new rebuilt Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier will be of Great Power to the Indian Navy as this has both the Indian & Russian Design. Will have other electronics of Indian , Russian & may be some of the electronics from the west.